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APPLYING THE LAW OF NEUTRALITY 
WHILE TRANSITING THE SEAS OF CYBERSPACE 
DANIELLE HIGSON* 
1 
Neutrality, in popular thought, means keeping out of war. It is the condition of those who remain 
at peace while others are fighting. In this sense, the problem of neutrality is as old as war itself 
From a more technical point of view, this is scarcely true because in its modern meaning 
"neutrality" is a legal status involving certain rights and duties. It therefore contemplates 
the existence of some sort of international legal system. 1 
l. INTRODUCTION 
Unlike the physical domains ofland, sea, air, and outer space, the new man-made domain 
of cyberspace cannot be seen or felt for it "is not a physical place - it defies measurement in any 
physical dimension or time-space continuum."2 Since its creation by man, cyberspace has greatly 
expanded the interconnectivity of the world. "Today, cyberspace is seamless and transcends 
international boundaries at the speed oflight."3 It has led to advancements in all areas oflife. At the 
same time, however, cyberspace creates great new vulnerabilities, which have the potential to disrupt 
peace and stability in the world. 4 
Although cyberspace has existed for the last several decades, there are still no international 
rules, much less standard definitions applicable to this new domain. 5 Utilizing cyber operations or 
' CDR Danielle Higson is the Director of the Cyber, Information Operations, and Intelligence Law Division of the 
Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy. She received her B.A. from Johns Hopkins University, her JD. from 
the University of Virginia School of Law, and her L.L.M. in International and Operational Law specializing in Cyber 
Law from the United States Army Judge Advocate General Legal Center and School (TJAGLCS). The views expressed 
in this Article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the policy or position of the Department of 
Defense or the United States government. 
1 See PHILIP C. JESSUP, NEUTRALITY: ITs HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND LAw, VOLUME IV: TODAY AND TOMORROW 3 (I976). 
2 See WALTER GARY SHARP, SR., CYBERSPACE AND THE USE OF FORCE I5 (I999) (noting nothing exists in cyberspace, 
rather, it either exists on a computer or is in transit within a telecommunications infrastructure). 
3 See Graham H. Todd, Armed Attack in Cyberspace: Deterring Asymmetric Warfare with an Asymmetric Definition, 64 A.F. 
L. REv. 65, 66 (2009). 
4 See Jonathan]. Frampton, Achieving National Unity of Effort in Cyber, 2-3, 5 (Jun. 16, 2011) (unpublished Master's 
thesis, Air Force Institute ofTechnology Graduate School of Engineering & Management) (on file with author), http:// 
www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA545358 (explaining that cyber creates a wide number of capabilities for 
threats against military systems beyond kinetic strikes that include, but are not limited to, covert communications, space 
system threats, multi-static radars, and more). 
5 See Paul A. Matus, Strategic Impact o/Cyber Warfare Rules for the United States, 1, 5, 10 (Mar. 25, 2010) (unpublished 
paper) (on file with United States Army War College), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA522001. 
2 NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF Vol. 6, No. 2 
"[d]etermining a response to a particular Cyber event is challenging in the current international 
environment."6 In creating theory and policy, it is essential that there is a meeting of the minds on 
the terms and definitions. 7 Among the differing definitions of cyberspace,8 the United States De-
partment of Defense (DoD) defines cyberspace as "[a] global domain within the information envi-
ronment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and 
resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embed-
ded processors and controllers."9 
Although DoD has a definition of cyberspace, it is at times paralyzed in conducting cyber 
operations due to a lack of any international agreement or even understanding on the application 
of sovereignty, the law of armed conflict, and neutrality in cyberspace. 10 "[M] ilitary strategists argue 
that these uncertainties have led to excess caution on the part of Pentagon planners" who are "tre-
mendously sensitive to collateral damage by virtual weapons, but not nearly sensitive enough to dam-
age by kinetic" ones. 11 In October 2011, the New York Times reported that the United States debat-
ed using cyber warfare to open the campaign against Libya in March 2011, but rejected its usage in 
favor of kinetic strikes. 12 In speculating on the reason behind the decision not to use cyber warfare, 
the article mentions "potential legal complications." 13 One of the impediments may have been a fear 
6 Frampton, supra note 4, at 13 (stating the United Nations Charter defines terms such as, an act of aggression, threat of 
use of force, and an armed attack in the context of]us Ad Bellum but are silent on their application in a cyber context). 
7 See generally MARK WESTON ]ANIS, AMERICA AND THE LAw OF NATIONS I776-I939 I-2 (20rn) (arguing the law 
referred to as the law of nations or international law has not meant the same thing to everyone, causing fierce debates 
in America over international law when in reality the two sides were actually arguing over different things); Ryan T. 
Kaminski, Escaping the Cyber State of Nature: Cyber Deterrence and International Institutions, CONFERENCE ON CYBER 
CONFLICT PROCEEDINGS 2010, 79, 84-85 (Christian Czosseck & Karlis Podins eds., 2010), https://ccdcoe.org/sites/ 
default/files/multimedia/pdf/Kaminski%20-%20Escaping%20the%20Cyber%20State%20of%20Nature%20Cyber%20 
deterrence%20and%201nternational%20Institutions.pd£ Kaminski%20%20Escaping%20the%20Cyber%20State%20 
of%20Nature%20deterrence%20and%201nternational%20Institutions.pdf (arguing that a lack of a generally accepted 
vocabulary in cyberspace can cause international law to be inconsistently interpreted leading to different reactions to the 
same cyber incident). 
8 Christian L. Basballe Sorensen, Cyber OODA: Towards a Conceptual Cyberspace Framework, 10 (Jun. 1, 2010) 
(unpublished thesis, Air University School of Advanced Air and Space Studies) (on file with author), http://www.dtic. 
mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA53695 l (noting definitions pertaining to cyberspace vary across organizations and 
authors). 
9 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., JornT PuB. I-02, DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND AssocIATED TERMS 58 (Nov. 8, 2010). 
10 See David E. Sanger et al., CYBERWAR; U.S. Plans Attack and Defense in Web Warfare, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/28/us/28cyber.html?ref=topics&_r=0 (explaining that the lack of articulation of a 
clear strategy and secrecy regarding the development of cyber weapons and the like hinders national debate); Duncan 
B. Hollis, Why States Need an International Law for Information Operations, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. rn23, rn53 (2007) 
(arguing that the uncertainty, insufficiency, and complexity of international law for cyber operations causes a disincentive 
for using cyber operations in favor of traditional use of force). 
11 John Markoff & Thom Shanker, Halted '03 Iraq Plan Illustrates U.S. Fear o/Cyberwar Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/02/us/politics/02cyber.html (partially quoting John Arquilla) (hinting that collateral 
damage to innocent third parties is a concerning potential repercussion of cyberwarfare). 
12 Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, U.S. Debated Cyberwarfore in Attack Plan on Libya, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/201 l/10/18/world/africa/cyber-warfare-against-libya-was-debated-by-us.html (explaining the 
cyberoffensive tactic was meant to disrupt and potentially disable the Qaddafi government's air-defense system). 
13 Id. (citing that one of which would be a question of whether the United States' military strike against the Libya air-
defense system might create domestic legal restrictions pursuant to the War Powers Resolution). 
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of violating the neutrality of a State such as Switzerland whose cyberspace the cyber weapons could 
have uncontrollably passed through in route to Libya. 
Of the many types of actions (social, economic, political) that are conducted in cyberspace, 
this paper focuses on those activities involved in cyber warfare. It "is essentially the use of networks 
and control systems to carry out organized disruptive, disabling, destructive or malicious attacks." 14 
"Cyber warfare can be used to describe various aspects of defending and attacking information and 
computer networks in cyberspace, as well as denying an adversary's ability to do the same." 15 Critical 
to any discussion of cyber warfare is the definition of a cyber weapon, since these instruments of de-
struction do not resemble traditional means of warfare. One proposal for a definition of a cyberspace 
weapon is "[a] ny capability, device, or combination of capabilities and techniques, which if used for 
its intended purpose, is likely to impair the integrity or availability of data, a program, or informa-
tion located on a computer or information processing system." 16 At least 140 States have programs 
to develop cyber weapons. 17 Cyber warfare has to be distinguished from cyber attacks, because not 
all attacks are cyber warfare. 18 ''A cyber attack is not an end in itself, but a powerful means to a wide 
variety of ends, from propaganda to espionage, from denial of service to the destruction of critical 
infrastructure." 19 This paper defines cyber warfare as cyber attacks between belligerents in an interna-
tional armed conflict in cyberspace. 20 
14 John Weed, Cyber Warfare: Understanding the Threat to Weapon Systems, 9 WEAPON SYSTEMS TECH. INFO. ANALYSIS 
Cm. Q. 2, 2 (2010), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a520062.pdf (defining cyber warfare as including tactics 
such as, disrupting military forces through disabling communication, gaining access to secure networks through hiding 
malicious code in computer chips, and breaching critical infrastructure). 
15 STEVEN A. HILDRETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30735, CYBERWARFARE i (2001) (focusing on the difficulty of 
determining the source of a cyber attack as a major concern). 
16 See Graham H. Todd, Armed Attack in Cyberspace: Deterring Asymmetric Warfare With an Asymmetric Definition, 64 
A.F. L. REv. 65, 83 (2009). 
17 See Arie]. Schaap, Cyber Warfare Operations: Development and Use Under International Law, 64 A.F. L. REv. 121, 134 
(2009). 
18 "Overbroad use of the terms 'cyber attack' and 'cyber warfare' and a failure to clearly define the various cyber 
capabilities also creates problems for the development of policy and doctrine for the use of these capabilities, as well as 
adding difficulty in developing a response to such activities." See Todd C. Huntley, Controlling the Use of Force in Cyber 
Space: The Application of the Law of Armed Conflict During a Time of Fundamental Change in the Nature ofWarfare, 60 
NAVAL L. REv. r, 4 (2010) (making a distinction that most cyber intrusions occurring every day to United States systems 
are not part of some broader cyber warfare campaign even though these intrusions are regularly referred to as cyber 
attacks); ENEKEN TIKK ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CYBER INCIDENTS: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS IOI (2010) (arguing for a 
terminology review, because of the confusion being caused by referring to all cyber attacks as either cyber war or cyber 
terrorism are misleading without analyzing the facts through the relevant legal frameworks). 
19 KENNETH GEERS, STRATEGIC CYBER SECURITY 9 (2on) (stating the Internet has created a new delivery mechanism for 
threats to national security). 
20 The UN Charter provides the contemporary rules of jus ad bellum, the principles of just war. See U.N. Charter art. 
2. In Article 2(4), it outlaws the "use of force" against another State. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para 4. In a situation where 
the "use of force" amounts to an "armed attack," Article 51 allows a State to legally respond in self-defense with force. See 
U.N. Charter art. 51. If the State responds with force against the other State, there will be an international armed conflict 
as referred to in Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions and a state of war as referred to in the Hague Conventions. See 
U.N. Charter art. 2. In this paper, international armed conflict and war are used synonymously. See YORAM DINSTEIN, 
WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 9-15 (3d ed. 2001); Sean Kanuck, Sovereign Discourse on Cyber Conflict Under 
International Law, 88 TEx. L. REv. 1571, 1585-90 (2010). 
4 NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF Vol. 6, No. 2 
Until recently, many believed in the impossibility of regulating cyberspace, because of the 
speed at which it transcends national boundaries. However, States have slowly began developing 
domestic criminal laws to regulate the conduct of its citizenry on the Internet, leading to the realiza-
tion that it is not a borderless wild frontier. With this awareness, the international community must 
decide how States will define, exert, and defend their sovereignty in cyberspace, while still preserving 
the utility of the Internet for cyber travelers. Although many, including the developers of the Inter-
net, argued that government should stay out of cyberspace, sovereignty is essential in order to control 
the chaos inherent in any environment where people have total freedom to do their will. 
It will be difficult to garner international support for any new regime to standardize conduct 
globally in cyberspace, since there is very little agreement amongst States on how cyberspace should 
be regulated. 21 The only treaty thus far to police cross-border Internet harm is the Council of Europe 
Convention on Cybercrime, which is widely viewed as unsuccessful. 22 In order to try to get most 
nations to ratify the treaty, it utilizes vague definitions that are open to multiple interpretations.23 Yet 
only two-thirds of the Council of Europe and the United States have ratified it. 24 Given this situa-
tion, we need to extrapolate what we can from the existing body of international law so that State 
action will create the customary international law of cyberspace. In its Strategy for Operating in 
Cyberspace, the United States DoD proposes that "[c]ontinued international engagement, collective 
self-defense, and the establishment of international cyberspace norms will serve to strengthen cyber-
space for the benefit of all."25 While the current international law does not directly address cyber-
space, States can apply the principles of international law. 
Over the last two decades, there has been a great deal of scholarship on the application of 
the law of armed conflict to cyberspace. Cyberwar has been accepted as a real possibility. With this 
acceptance, there has been some limited discussion on how to treat neutrality in cyberspace. What 
obligations does a neutral State have to remain neutral in a cyberwar? What does international law 
require of a belligerent in regard to a neutral State? Some scholars have warned if the United States 
is not careful, it could unintentionally abandon its neutral status. 26 A misguided view of the law of 
21 See Jack Goldsmith, Cybersecurity Treaties: A Skeptical View, FUTURE CHALLENGES IN NATIONAL SECURITY AND LAw 
5-7 (Peter Berkowitz ed. 2011), http://media.hoover.org/ sites/ default/ files/ documents/FutureChallenges_ Goldsmith. 
pdf; Charles]. Dunlap Jr., Perspectives for Cyber Strategists on Law for Cyberwar, 5 STRATEGIC STUDIES Q. 81, 83 (2011), 
http://www.au.afmil/au/ssq/2011/spring/dunlap.pdf; Toby L. Friesen, Resolving Tomorrow's Conflicts Today: How 
New Developments Within the U.N Security Council Can Be Used to Combat Cyberwarfore, 58 NAVAL L. REv. 89, 107 
(2009) (suggesting that because of the high likelihood of a cyber conflict occurring before the time an international 
treaty or customary law on cyberspace is developed, that U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373 should be applied to 
cyberwarfare). 
22 Goldsmith, supra note 21, at 3-4 (mandating signatory nations adopt legislation banning cybercrimes such as illegal 
access and interception of data, intellectual property offenses, data and system interference, among others). 
23 Id. at 4 (conceding that convention lacks enforcement mechanisms resulting in signatories flouting or ignoring 
provisions). 
24 Id. (referencing the significant hold-out member states are Belgium, Georgia, Greece, Ireland, Poland, Russian, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom). 
25 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN CYBERSPACE 2 (2011). 
26 Stephen W Korns & Joshua E. Kastenberg, Georgia's Cyber Left Hook, 38 PARAMETERS 60, 71-73 (2008) (identifying 
the July 2008 DDoS attack against Georgia as a cybercrime, but the following DDoS attack in August 2008 as an act 
of cyber war, which resulted in the withdrawal of the United States from Georgia's support in order to remain neutral); 
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neutrality should not, however, impair a State's ability to act in cyberspace or to limit its assistance to 
other states during a cyber crisis. 
A fear of violating the law of neutrality should not discourage States from utilizing offensive 
cyber operations, "a range of potential activities that [can] be aimed at foreign computer systems: 
from straight intelligence collection ... , to counterintelligence operations ... , to covert actions 
conducted abroad ... , to cyberwarfare."27 If wars are still going to occur despite the United Nations 
(UN) Charter, cyberwarfare offers the possibility of defeating the enemy with less loss of human life 
and physical damages than kinetic warfare.28 
''A cyber-only victory could facilitate post-war diplomacy, economic recovery, and 
reconciliation."29 One possible example is the Stuxnet computer worm launched by an unidentified 
source against Iran's nuclear centrifuges in 2010. 30 It appears Stuxnet sole mission was "to attack and 
destroy as many of the Iranian uranium enrichment centrifuges as possible thereby directly slowing 
down the progress of the Iranian nuclear programme."31 At the Natanz nuclear research establish-
ment, it damaged approximately 1,000 centrifuges used for Uranium enrichment.32 "Stuxnet may 
have been more effective than a conventional military attack and may have avoided a major inter-
national crisis over collateral damage."33 In addition, States should not fail to aid another State in a 
cyber crisis out of an apprehension of losing its neutral status. 
Once thought to be borderless and free of government control, States are transforming cyber-
space by exerting their sovereignty in this new domain. Given the unique nature and purpose of cy-
berspace, a right to "transit passage" is necessary for the continued functionality of the Internet as we 
know it. As sovereignty is recognized in cyberspace, there is concern about violating another State's 
neutrality. Only international armed conflict, however, triggers the law of neutrality. Therefore, a fear 
of violating neutrality should restrict actions in cyberspace only in the limited circumstances of an 
international armed conflict. In these circumstances, international law should acknowledge that the 
law of neutrality is not violated by packets merely transiting through a neutral State. 
In the following sections, this paper will discuss the Internet, sovereignty, the law of armed 
conflict, the law of neutrality, and the 2008 cyber attacks of Georgia. Part II describes the develop-
Joshua E. Kastenberg, Non-Intervention and Neutrality in Cyberspace: An Emerging Principle in the National Practice of 
International Law, 64 A.F. L. REv. 43, 44 (2008) (acknowledging compelling reasons to remain neutral include limiting 
damage of warfare to warring states and commercial losses due to conflict). 
27 Steven G. Bradbury, Partner, Dechert, LLP., Keynote Address at the Harvard National Security Journal Symposium: 
The Developing Legal Framework for Defensive and Offensive Cyber Operations (Mar. 4, 20n), http://harvardnsj.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/201 l/04/Vol.-2_Bradbury_Final.pdf. 
28 See JeffreyT.G. Kelsey, Note, Hacking into International Humanitarian Law: The Principles of Distinction and 
Neutrality in the Age ofCyber Warfare, 106 MICH. L. REv. 1427, 1447 (2008). 
29 GEERS, supra note 19, at 13 (articulating that cyber attacks could be key for future wars and victory can be achieved 
prior to combat). 
30 Id. at 13 (doubting that a cyber attack similar to Stuxnet will occur often as modern critical infrastructure poses many 
problems because of its complexity); see also Schmitt & Shanker, supra note 12 (explaining Stuxnet was a computer worm 
that prevented an Iranian nuclear power plant from producing nuclear fuel). 
31 DR. K, THE REAL HACKERS' HANDBOOK 247 (4th ed. 2011). 
32 Id. at 246. 
33 GEERS, supra note 19, at 13 (arguing that the code used to deploy Stuxnet efficiently solved what five years ofU.N. 
Security Council resolutions could not have done, which was to disrupt Iran from creating a nuclear bomb). 
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ment, structure, and importance of the Internet, which is necessary background for deciding how 
to apply sovereignty in cyberspace. Part III explores how the international community should treat 
sovereignty in cyberspace and argues for the adoption of a regime of "transit passage." Part IV looks 
at the relevance of the law of armed conflict in cyberspace. Part V contends that the law of neutral-
ity only applies in cyberspace in the limited circumstances that the law of armed conflict is triggered. 
In those situations, it maintains that the Hague Conventions provide for the transit of electrons 
through cyberspace without violating neutrality. Part VI wraps up analyzing how States did not lose 
neutral status by assisting Georgia in 2008 during its cyber crisis. Before looking at how sovereignty 
and the law of neutrality apply in cyberspace, it is important to understand the structure and value of 
the Internet. 
II. THE CENTERPIECE OF CYBERSPACE - THE INTERNET 
"The Net negates geometry. While it does have a definite topology of computational nodes 
and radiating boulevards for bits, and while the locations of the nodes and links can be plotted 
on plans to produce surprisingly Haussmann-like diagrams, it is fundamentally and profoundly 
antispatial."34 It is not a definable or describable place. Yet, one can find things within the Internet 
that one did not know existed nor where they were located.35 "The Net is ambient - nowhere in 
particular but everywhere at once."36 One can access the Internet by logging on from wherever one 
is physically located,37 placing oneself virtually in cyberspace while simultaneously remaining in the 
territorial sovereign of where one began the journey. While virtually exploring cyberspace, one seam-
lessly transcends into and across the cyberspace of other States. These unique characteristics pose a 
challenge for sovereignty. Although the Internet is only a subset of cyberspace, this paper primarily 
concentrates on the Internet in exploring how to create a regime for sovereignty in cyberspace. This 
section examines the characteristics of the Internet that will impact the choice of a regime. 
A. The Birth of the Internet 
In the interest of National Security, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) provid-
ed the funding and institutional support for the research that led to the development of the Inter-
net. 38 Despite DoD's motives, the aspirations and vision of a unique group of electrical engineers and 
unorthodox computer programmers, who desired to redesign the way computers worked in order to 
amplify human thinking and communication, designed the Internet. 39 Desiring to keep the Inter-
34 WILLIAM]. MITCHELL, CITY OF BITS 8 (1995). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 8-9. 
38 ELIZABETH c. HANSON, THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION AND WORLD POLITICS 57 (2008). 
39 Id. (reasoning that DoD originally wanted to create a computer network that could survive a nuclear attack but began 
the creation of something much bigger). 
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net free from government, these founders built a system of decentralized control. 40 "In effect, they 
built strains of American libertarianism, and even 1960s idealism, into the universal language of the 
Internet."41 
This DoD computer research program was in the Advanced Projects Research Agency 
(ARPA). 42 J.C. R. Licklider, a psychologist at MIT, headed the program.43 The DoD created ARPA 
with a broad mandate to fund cutting-edge research and strategically placed the Agency directly 
below the Secretary of Defense. 44 "Throughout the 1960s groups at various universities and research 
centers were funded to work on different aspects of interactive computing and networking." 45 First, 
the research focused on enabling users to interact with a computer through a terminal, which then 
turned to connecting computers in different geographic locations to enable them to collaborate and 
share materials. 46 In 1965, the researchers linked a computer in Massachusetts to one in California 
through a telephone network, but large blocks of data caused problems when they created traffic 
jams.47 A packet-switching network, which "allows for faster travel speeds, a higher volume of infor-
mation, and permits the system to withstand additional stresses,''48 still utilized today, turned out to 
be the solution.49 
In the fall of 1969 at UCLA, the first computer network, ARPANET, was born. 50 It was 
deliberately designed with "a distributed, redundant structure so that it could survive partial nuclear 
destruction and the knockout of military headquarters." 51 By the end of that year, four host com-
puters connected approximately one thousand researchers around the country. 52 The network got 
bigger and bigger and was utilized more for sending messages than its original purpose of sharing 
expensive resources among the different research centers. 53 In 1975, the military became interested in 
the network and began using it for communication. 54 In 1982, the network was split into MILNET, 
40 ]ACK GOLDSMITH & TIM Wu, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?, ILLUSIONS OF BoRDERLESS WORLD 23 (2006) 
(referring to the structure of the Internet's design as open, minimalist, and neutral because it is willing to accept any time 
of computer or network to join, does not require much of the computers or networks to join, and treats all applications 
the same). 
41 Id. 
42 HANSON, supra note 38 at 57. 
43 HANSON, supra note 38 at 57. 
44 HANSON, supra note 38 at 58 (commenting the design was to ensure the project would be independent of pressures 
from individual services for specific projects). 
45 See HANSON, supra note 38 at 58 (asserting that there was interest throughout the United States of people who were 
eager to reinvent computing). 
46 See HANSON, supra note 38 at 58. 
47 See HANSON, supra note 38 at 58. 
48 See Sharon R. Stevens, Internet war Crimes Tribunals and Security in an Interconnected World, 18 TRANSNAT'L L. & 
CoNTEMP. PROBS. 657, 659 (2009) (citing ANDREW D. MURRAY, THE REGULATION OF CYBERSPACE 6o-6I (2007)). 
49 HANSON, supra note 38, at 58 (designing the system to distribute messages by breaking them up into individual 
packets which could travel an independent route to the destination where they would then be put back into one packet). 
50 MITCHELL, supra note 34, at 107. 
51 MITCHELL, supra note 34, at I50 (analogizing that the distributed design is unlike banana republics because it does 
not have a clear center of authority, which makes it difficult to take over in a coup). 
52 HANSON, supra note 38, at 59. 
53 HANSON, supra note 38, at 59. 
54 HANSON, supra note 38, at 59. 
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an operational military network under tight security, and ARPANET, a network for connecting the 
ARPA-funded researchers. 55 Through the 1980s, more networks (BITNET, CSNET, FIDONET, 
USENET, etc.) came online and today, these linked networks are known as the Internet.56 
The Internet became more usable for the average person when in 1991, Tim Berners-Lee 
and his group at the European Center for Nuclear Research in Switzerland unveiled the World Wide 
Web, allowing an Internet user to click on a hyperlink and go directly to that information. 57 Soon 
thereafter, web browsers made the web friendlier to the recreational user and the number of Internet 
users has continued to grow. 58 "The development of the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and 
the World Wide Web gave rise to the e-commerce boom of the late 1990s."59 
B. The Backbone of the Internet 
The Internet is a very large system of interconnected networks "with significant built-in 
capacity to resist concentrations of power and authoritarian control."60 It is a packet-switching net-
work, which distributes messages by breaking them up into smaller addressed packets that follow 
independent routes to their destination, where they are reassembled into the original message. 61 In-
stead of a central control, independent routers ensure "the addressed packets flow around saturated 
channels."62 Not only does this system provide improved efficiency, it provides a more secure system 
of communication.63 "If one node goes down, the network reroutes around it."64 Depending on the 
demand at any given time, packets travel on the most efficient path, causing there to be no predict-
able paths of travel. 65 There is also no way of prohibiting a packet from traveling on an open network 
of a particular State.66 One message, depending on size, can be divided up into multitude of packets, 
which all theoretically can travel on a different path through the cyberspace of different sovereign 
55 HANSON, supra note 38, at 59. 
56 George K Walker, Information Warfare and Neutrality, 33 VAND.]. TRANSNAT'L L. 1079, 1094-95 (2000) (noting 
ARPANET was renamed DARPANET, which ended in 1989). 
57 HANSON, supra note 38, at 62. 
58 HANSON, supra note 38, at 62 (explaining the browser program, Mosaic, helped launch the popularity of the Internet 
when it began to circulate American universities in 1993). 
59 Kyle Dobitz et al., The Characterization and Measurement of Cyber Warfare 3 (May 2008) (unpublished paper) (on 
file with USSTRATCOM Global Innovation and Strategy Center), http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadata 
Prefix=html&identifier=ADA497907. 
60 MITCHELL, supra note 34, at 150 (emphasizing that although a decentralized model can be beneficial, it allows 
subversives to lurk in the uncontrolled territory, which has led both governmental and commercial organizations to create 
"firewalls" to secure computers). 
61 WALKER, supra note 56, at 1096 (extrapolating that if messages are broken up into smaller packets and travel different 
routes because of overloaded routes, it is possible that the smaller packets may travel through computers in multiple 
countries and reassemble in another country). 
62 HANSON, supra note 38, at 58. 
63 HANSON, supra note 38, at 58. 
64 HANSON, supra note 38, at 58. 
65 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0 63 (2006) (describing the difficulty the packet-switching design poses for law 
enforcement in performing wiretaps because it is difficult to predict which path packets will take unlike in a circuit-
switched network where there is only one route a message can travel). 
66 See MITCHELL, supra note 34, at 150-51. 
Vol. 6, No. 2 TRANSITING THE SEAS OF CYBERSPACE 9 
States to their final destination, where they will be reassembled into the original message.67 
Different computers and networks are able to communicate with each other because they 
were all designed to use the same universal language, Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Proto-
col (TCP/IP). 68 ARPA required the use of this common language, which spread because of its open 
design and its freely available software and documentation.69 
No single entity- academic, corporate, governmental, or non-profit - adminis-
ters the Internet. It exists and functions as a result of the fact that hundreds of thousands 
of separate operators of computers and computer networks independently decided to 
use common data transfer protocols to exchange communications and information 
with other computers .... There is no centralized storage location, control point, or 
communications channel for the Internet, and it would not be technically feasible for 
a single entity to control all of the information conveyed on the Internet.70 
A great deal of the functionality of the Internet is attributed to the end-to-end principle, 
which network architects, Jerome Saltzer, David Reed, and David Clark, used as their guiding prin-
ciple in designing the Internet. 71 
Rather than build into this network a complex set of functionality thought to be 
needed by every single application, this network philosophy pushes complexity to the 
edge of the network - to the applications that run on the network, rather than the 
network's core. The core is kept as simple as possible.72 
So any changes to the architecture of the Internet such as authentication or content filter-
ing should not be done by changes to the network itself, but rather by applications attached to the 
network. 73 
The backbone of the Internet being the packet-switching network and the common lan-
guage of TCP/IP is essential to maintain the current interoperable Internet.74 In the interest of cyber 
security, commercial and governmental organizations utilize firewalls to protect themselves from the 
evils lurking on the Internet.75 These firewalls are applications that keep computers safe from some 
attacks and prevent some websites from being seen, but they do not stop the flow of electrons on the 
network, which crosses all State boundaries. 
67 See WALKER, supra note 56, at 1095. 
68 See HANSON, supra note 38, at 6r. 
69 See HANSON, supra note 38, at 61 ("The Internet became the network of networks using this protocol.") .. 
70 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 832 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (explaining the court's findings of fact regarding the creation 
of the internet and the development of cyberspace). 
71 LESSIG, supra note 65, at 44 (commending the end-to-end principle as being an important reason the Internet has 
produced innovation and growth but attributing consequences to it such as making identification and authentication 
extremely difficult). 
72 LESSIG, supra note 65, at 44. 
73 LESSIG, supra note 65, at 44. 
74 HANSON, supra note 38, at 64. 
75 MITCHELL, supra note 34, at 150-51 (analogizing firewalls to ancient walled cities that only allowed traffic to pass 
through narrow gates to be defended from unwarranted attacks). 
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C World-wide Dependence on the Internet 
Since its humble beginnings in a research lab in 1969, "cyberspace has grown and spread to 
become a commons, a critical infrastructure that is pervasive and upon which societies worldwide 
have become dependent for commerce, recreation, communication, delivery of government services, 
research, education and a host of other activities."76 A key qualification to being a major State power 
today is Internet connectivity. 77 In order to survive as a State and remain economically competitive, 
States have to embrace the Internet and continue to build the infrastructure that it requires.78 The 
global networking of high speed information processing systems are "made possible by the ground 
based international telecommunications infrastructure and a growing constellation of satellites which 
provide countries with a means to acquire and transmit information."79 
In 2010, global Internet usage was over 2 billion people. 80 Most States have public facili-
ties, such as libraries and Internet cafes, where people can log onto the Internet for free. 81 "U.S. and 
international businesses trade goods and services in cyberspace, moving assets across the globe in 
seconds. In addition to facilitating trade in other sectors, cyberspace is itself a key sector of the global 
economy."82 Around the world, States' critical infrastructures such as power distribution, telecom-
munications, banking, emergency services, transportation, national defense, and more are becoming 
ever dependent on the efficiencies offered by cyberspace. 83 Stock exchanges and Air Traffic Control 
around the world are linked and dependent on the cyber infrastructure. 84 Cyberspace has become 
the seas of commerce and the backbone of our global society, which demands a regime of sovereignty 
that will ensure the free flow of electrons currently enjoyed on the Internet. 
76 Julie ].C.H. Ryan et al., Cybersecurity Regulation: Using Analogies to Develop Frameworks for Regulation, INT'L CYBER 
SEC. LEGAL & POLICY PROCEEDINGS 76, 78 (Eneken Tikk & Anna-Maria Taliharm eds., 2010), https://ccdcoe.org/ 
publications/legalproceedings/Ryan_Ryan_ Tikk_Cybersecurity%20Regulation.pdf. 
77 HANSON, supra note 38, at 184 (noting countries under authoritative regimes have approached the issue of controlling 
the flow of information in different ways such as North Korea, which for the most part avoids Internet connectivity with 
the rest of the world). 
78 MITCHELL, supra note 34, at 168 (favoring the development of an open architecture system where anyone would be 
allowed to set up a server and participate). 
79 Thomas C. Wingfield, Legal Aspects of Offensive Information Operations in Space, 9 U.S.A.F.]. OF LEG. STUD. 121, 123 
(1999). 
80 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 25, at 1. 
81 Dennis D. Strouble & Mary C. Carroll, Law and Cyber Wtir, SAIS 2008 PROCEEDINGS Paper 37, 1 (2008), http:// 
aisel.aisnet.org/sais2008/37 (indicating many aspects of global infrastructure such as, health care, telecommunications, 
and energy are interconnected to the Internet while the law is the one discipline that is lacking). 
82 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 25, at 1 (noting the Internet has aided in the cultivation of new technologies and 
entrepreneurship, the spread of free speech, and development of new social networks). 
83 Wingfield, supra note 79, at 122-23. 
84 Wingfield, supra note 79, at 123 (explaining that all services connected to the Internet are vulnerable to information 
attack). 
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III. ESTABLISHING SOVEREIGNTY IN THE NEWEST FRONTIER 
"To Aristotle the idea of a placeless, borderless community would have seemed very strange; 
it appeared self-evident to him that a state - a self-governing political unit - had a definite, 
bounded territory in which the citizens lived and over which they exerted control."85 Defining what 
constitutes sovereignty, however, is very difficult. 86 Sovereignty is defined as "1. Supreme dominion, 
authority or rule. 2. The supreme political authority of an independent state. 3. The state itself." 87 
The definition does not specify what sovereignty includes. In Article 2(4), the Charter of the United 
Nations speaks of protecting territorial integrity, "[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."88 "Preserv-
ing state sovereignty is a vital goal of both state-based international organizations and individual 
countries." 89 Sovereignty, however, is treated differently in each physical domain, striking a balance 
between States' interests and global needs. 
A. The Essence of Sovereignty 
"Just as nature gives each man an absolute power over all his own limbs, the social pact gives 
the body politic an absolute power over all its members; and it is this same power which, directed 
by the general will, bears, as I have said, the name of sovereignty."90 Philosophers have debated the 
value of sovereignty for centuries. There is the pull of the natural state of being versus the need 
for laws and regulations, which come with a society. Sovereignty is important for rule and order. 
In order to have property rights, mankind must have sovereignty. In the 1600s, the philosopher, 
Thomas Hobbes, discussed in his writings how society exists and why it is needed given the "state of 
nature."91 He concluded that society was necessary to put rules on man in order to control his unfet-
tered desires. 92 Benedict De Spinoza, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau continued on his rea-
soning.93 In a Social Contract, Rousseau explains about different types of government and how they 
derive their power to govern.94 He acknowledges that man must give up his freedom to be governed, 
but in turn, government protects him and his possessions.95 "What man loses by the social contract is 
85 MITCHELL, supra note 34, at r5r. 
86 Patrick W Franzese, Sovereignty in Cyberspace: Can it Exist?, 64 A.F. L. REv. r, 8 (2009) (relying on Professor Stephen 
Krasner's definition of sovereignty which conceptualizes sovereignty as being composed of domestic sovereignty, 
interdependence sovereignty, international legal sovereignty, and Westphalian sovereignty). 
87 BLACKS LAw DICTIONARY 1524 (9th ed. 2009). 
88 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
89 Franzese, supra note 86, at 7. 
90 ]EAN-]ACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 74 (Maurice Cranston trans., Penguin Books 1968) (1762). 
91 BERTRAND DE JouvENEL, SOVEREIGNTY; AN INQUIRY INTO THE PUBLIC GOOD. 231-32 (J.F. Huntington trans., Phoenix 
Books 1963) (1957). 
92 Id. at 245-46. 
93 Id. at 23r. 
94 See generally ]EAN-]ACQUES RoussEAu, supra note 90, at 74. 
95 See generally ]EAN-]ACQUES RoussEAu, supra note 90 at 64-65. 
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his natural liberty and absolute right to anything that tempts him and that he can take; what he gains 
by the social contract is civil liberty and the legal right of property in what he possesses."96 
A domain is an area where control is exerted.97 "Since classical times, two domains of opera-
tion dominated military and civilian operations: land and sea."98 With the development of powered 
flight in 1904, the domain of air became a new possibility.99 Finally in 1955, the birth of the "space 
age" opened the last physical domain, space, but it was not until the 1980s that "the US DoD ac-
knowledged outer space as a fourth war fighting domain." 100 Even after the international community 
recognized each of these domains, it took time for States to create specifically tailored treaties for 
each domain to address sovereignty. 
Now the world community needs to address the development of cyberspace and how sov-
ereignty should relate to this new domain, which is like no other for it is man-made and does not 
physically exist. Although once thought to be merely an enhancement to the other existing domains, 
the concept of cyberspace as its own domain was recently accepted. 101 Even though cyberspace is very 
different from the other naturally occurring domains, it does share some similarities. 
B. Sovereignty in the Physical Domains 
"The global reach of the Internet, a network of networks, leads some to assume it is ungovern-
able since it reaches beyond national borders." 102 Similar concerns existed when mankind entered the 
domains of air and space. 103 
When states and individuals started developing the technological capability to en-
ter the domains of sea, air, and outer space, strong arguments existed for each of these 
domains to remain free from sovereign control. However, state interests, such as trade 
and national security, combined with a state's technological capabilities, ultimately 
prevailed over these arguments and determined the current legal status of these do-
mains.104 
96 See generally ]EAN-]ACQUES RoussEAu, supra note 90 at 65. 
97 Patrick D. Allen & Dennis P. Gilbert, Jr., The Information Sphere Domain Increasing Understanding and Cooperation, 
THE VIRTUAL BATTLEFIELD: PERSPECTIVES ON CYBER WARFARE 132, 133 (Christian Czosseck & Kenneth Geers eds., 2009), 
https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/ multimedia/pdf/09 _ GILBERT%201nfoSphere. pdf (adding that a domain is also a 
sphere of activity, function, or activity). 
98 Id. at 132. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. (examining the historical trends for recognizing new domains as following the sequences of acknowledging a 
capability to operate in a domain is developed, which then becomes relatively commonplace, the capabilities in the 
domain become recognized and exploited, the unique nature of the capabilities are further developed, and the domain is 
continually developed through institutional and financial support). 
101 Sorensen, supra note 8, at 92. 
102 Frampton, supra note 4, at 11. 
103 Frampton, supra note 4, at 11 (examining that because the systems that provide access to the Internet physically 
reside within a country's jurisdiction as does the information therein, coupled with the fact that one may traverse 
across the globally within milliseconds, States must consider how they can govern the Internet locally, nationally, and 
internationally). 
104 Franzese, supra note 86, at 29 (suggesting there are advocates who claim that because cyberspace as a domain is in its 
infancy, government interference should be deterred in favor of sovereignty). 
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Therefore, before looking at how to achieve sovereignty in cyberspace, one can gain insight 
by looking at how States addressed sovereignty in the other domains of land, sea, air, and space. 
Although ultimately codified in treatises, these international regimes resulted from State practices. 105 
Since cyberspace will most likely follow the same trajectory, current State practices in cyberspace are 
critical to its future. 
i. Land 
Originally, principles of sovereignty were about controlling territory and the people in it. 
"During the 17'h century, the concept of sovereigns as individual monarchs gave way to the Westpha-
lian state system of governments as sovereigns." 106 Since the peace of Westphalia in 1648, the inter-
national system has been dominated by the State actor, which holds exclusive authority over the land 
and people within its geographic boundary. 107 "Under [this] traditional understanding of sovereignty, 
[States] occupy a territorially-defined physical locus, such that 'sovereignty' and 'country' are inex-
tricably intertwined. [States] are defined by the territory they control, and [States] possess exclusive 
authority over events within their borders." 108 Before long, States had to decide on a regime for the 
seas. 
ii. Sea 
The seas, which cover "two-thirds of the world's surface,'' 109 originally were not controlled or 
owned. 110 Over time, this led way to the high seas being open to all with sovereign States only exert-
ing control over the territorial seas bordering its country. 111 "The evolution of the law can be seen as 
a response to, and a reconciliation of, the conflicting interests of the Members of the international 
105 Franzese, supra note 86, at 29 (noting that this reliance on state practices "means that a change in state interests or 
technological capabilities might change the legal status of these domains"). 
106 
]. CHRISTIAN KESSLER, VERIFYING NONPROLIFERATION TREATIES 3 (1995) (explaining that in a Westphalian system, 
states act independently and answer to no higher authority. Prior to this system, even monarchs were beholden to God, 
"and, prior to the reformation, the Pope."). 
107 Jeffrey K. Walker, Thomas P. Keenan Memorial Lecture The Demise of the Nation-State, the Dawn of New Paradigm 
Warfare, and a Future for the Profession of Arms, 51 A.F. L. REv. 323, 324 (2001). 
108 Kyle Dobitz et al., supra note 59, at 14 (citing Jeffrey K. Walker, The Demise of the Nation-State, the Dawn of New 
Paradigm Warfare, and a Future for the Profession of Arms, 51 A.F. L. REv. 323 (2001)). 
109 D. W BowETT, THE LAw OF THE SEA 1 (1967). 
11° Franzese, supra note 86, at 18-19 (quoting Roman Emperor Justinian I, who wrote the earliest recorded statement 
on the law of the sea and "declared that the sea and its fish were available to all and no state could extend its jurisdiction 
beyond the shore, which was defined as the high-water mark''). 
111 Franzese, supra note 86, at 18-19 (noting that, in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, the debate over 
who controlled the seas was divided between two camps: those who believed in mare liberum, or "open seas," and those 
who believed in marre clausum, or "closed seas." Eventually, the prevailing legal theories acknowledged that states "enjoy 
some rights to regulate in their own interests activities in the seas adjoining their coasts."); R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V 
LowE, THE LAw OF THE SEA 59 (rev. ed., St. Martin's Press 1988) (1983). 
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community." 112 Hugo Grotius, originally a proponent of freedom of the seas, eventually agreed with 
other jurists that States have the right to regulate the seas along their coasts. 113 In 1625, Grotius 
determined the territorial sea to be an area in which a state could exert control over those sailing on 
it, as it could control someone on its land. 114 Cornelius van Bynkershoek adopted this principle in 
1702. 115 "In those times, the coastal [S]tate was able to exercise control over the sea within the range 
of a canon shot, namely, three miles. The three-mile limit has become thus the traditional breadth of 
the territorial sea." 116 By the beginning of the nineteenth century, it was a principle of international 
law that the high seas were free and open while States could exert sovereignty in their territorial wa-
ters.117 
Since early times, the law of the sea has had to balance conflicting economic, political, and 
strategic interests among States. 118 "With the geometric expansion of international trade following 
World War II ... and the increasing awareness of interdependence among the nations of the free 
world, the importance of the freedom of the seas and navigation in their waters and airspace were 
reemphasized." 119 This concept of sovereignty was first codified in the 1958 Convention on the High 
Seas, and culminated in 1982 with the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UN CLOS III), 120 which established national and international waters and airspace. 121 National wa-
ters include a State's internal waters and its territorial seas. 122 It set the territorial seas as twelve nauti-
cal miles from the States' shores. 123 The international waters include the contiguous zones, exclusive 
economic zones, and the high seas. 124 "Ships and aircraft enjoy high seas freedoms,'' which include 
freedom of navigation and overflight of international waters. 125 
Although sovereignty is recognized in the territorial waters of a State, UN CLOS III provides 
for the "innocent" passage of ships, not aircraft, through these waters "for the purpose of continu-
ous and expeditious traversing of the territorial sea'' as long as "it is not prejudicial to the peace, 
good order or security of the coastal State." 126 The Convention prohibits the launch and recovery of 
aircraft and any exercise with weapons while a ship is conducting innocent passage, considering these 
112 BowETT, supra note 109, at 1. 
113 Franzese, supra note 86, at 19; see also R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V LowE, supra note 111. 
114 ]OHN KISH, THE LAw OF INTERNATIONAL SPACES 6 (1973). 
115 KISH, supra note 114, at 6. 
116 KISH, supra note 114, at 6. 
117 Franzese, supra note 86, at 19 (attributing this change in philosophy to the comparative peace of the nineteenth 
century, during which the sea had come to signify a medium for trade). 
118 BowETT, supra note 109, at 1. 
119 ]OHN NORTON MOORE ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAw 723 (1990) ("It is apparent ... that the legal regime of the 
oceans can have a significant impact on national security."). 
12° Franzese, supra note 86, at 21 (citing United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, pt. II, § 3, 
1833 U.N.T.S. 397.) [hereinafter UNCLOS III]. 
121 DEP'T OF THE NAVY, NWP l-14M, THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, 1-2 (2007) 
[hereinafter COMMANDERS HANDBOOK]. 
122 COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 121, at 1-2. 
123 Franzese, supra note 86, at 20. 
124 COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 121, at 1-2. 
125 COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 121, at 1-2. 
126 UN CLOS III, supra note 120, at pt. II, § 3. 
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acts to be prejudicial to the peace of the coastal State. 127 "In the territorial sea, submarines and other 
underwater vehicles are required to navigate on the surface and to show their flag." 128 The Conven-
tion permits coastal States to "suspend temporarily in specified areas of its territorial sea the innocent 
passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the protection of its security." 129 
In straits used for international navigation, UN CLOS III provides for the right of "transit 
passage,'' "freedom of navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious 
transit of the strait between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part 
of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone." 130 During "transit passage,'' ships and submarines 
can transit in their normal mode of operation. 131 Bordering States are not allowed to suspend transit 
passage. 132 The Convention carefully balances a State's need for security with the world's needs for 
the freedom of navigation of the seas for commerce and trade. It is a balance like this that the new 
domain of cyberspace requires. 
iii. Air 
Like cyberspace, the air was initially thought to be common to all. 133 With the rise of proper-
ty rights, the belief that the owner of the land also owned the air above it became the law. 134 The con-
cept of air sovereignty came with the age of flight, 135 and international law regarding air sovereignty 
started with state practice. 136 "The actions of various states throughout World War I, especially neu-
tral countries' refusal to allow overflight, firmly established air sovereignty as customary international 
law by the end of the war." 137 The first codification was in 1919 in the Convention for the Regula-
tion of Aerial Navigation in France, commonly known as the Paris Convention. 138 It established 
exclusive sovereignty in the air, but it made an exception for the right of innocent passage across the 
airspace. 139 The final codification was in the Convention on International Civil Aviation, commonly 
referred to as the Chicago Convention, which states: "the contracting States recognize that every 
127 UN CLOS III, supra note 120, at pt. II, § 3. 
128 UN CLOS III, supra note 120, at pt. II, § 3. 
129 UN CLOS III, supra note 120, at pt. II, § 3. 
130 UN CLOS III, supra note 120, at pt. III, § 2. 
131 UN CLOS III, supra note 120, at pt. III, § 2. 
132 UN CLOS III, supra note 120, at pt. III, § 2. 
133 Franzese, supra note 86, at 22 (citing Charles Anthony Roberts, Air Sovereignty and International Law 5-7 (1959) 
(unpublished M.A. thesis, on file with Muir S. Fairchild Research Information Center at Maxwell Air Force Base)) 
(explaining that, under Roman law, the air was considered omnium communes, or something that "was incapable of being 
the object of a private right," and, subsequently, common to all). 
134 Franzese, supra note 86, at 22; Roberts, supra note 133, at 5. 
135 Franzese, supra note 86, at 22 (noting that, although the age of flight curtailed the idea of private ownership of 
airspace, it brought about this "concept of air sovereignty). 
136 Franzese, supra note 86, at 22. 
137 Franzese, supra note 86, at 22; Roberts supra note 133, at 49-55; see also DAVID H. N. JOHNSON, RIGHTS IN Am 
SPACE 32 (1965). 
138 Franzese, supra note 86, at 23. 
139 Franzese, supra note 86, at 23 (understanding that this "innocent passage" exception in air sovereignty echoes the 
"innocent passage" exception in sea sovereignty). 
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State has complete and exclusive sovereignty above its territory'' and does not recognize any right of 
"innocent passage." 140 Therefore, planes cannot fly through national airspace without permission of 
the sovereign, which can complicate air travel. "While [S]tates ultimately resolved the issue of [S]tate 
sovereignty in air, they left unresolved the question of how high sovereignty extended." 141 
iv. Outer Space 
With the dawn of rockets and satellites, the world had to decide how high up a State's sov-
ereignty goes. 142 Some argued that it extended indefinitely, but this was not practical given the laws 
of planetary science and the lack of ability to exert control in space. 143 "Sovereignty can only truly 
exist if states can exert control, or sovereignty over the areas they claim." 144 Prior to the launching 
of satellites and the beginning of actual space research in 19 5 7, no sovereign conducted activity in 
outer space, thus precluding any effective control over outer space and the celestial bodies. 145 The 
United States and the Soviet Union were the first States to conduct actual research in outer space, 
but neither State made any territorial claim. 146 In 1958, the two States came to an early agreement to 
prohibit territorial sovereignty over outer space. 147 United States policy makers "faced the challenge 
to develop policy that protected Space for peaceful purposes for the good of all mankind, while at the 
same time that responded to the potential Armageddon-like conflict in the frigid, biting reality of the 
Cold War arms race." 148 
The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 codifies the legal status of outer space as free from sover-
eignty.149 China, however, is challenging this principle and arguing that their sovereignty extends 
into outer space, because there is no definition of where territorial air space ends and outer space 
begins. 150 Even though the Treaty provides that exploration in space is supposed to be for peace-
140 The Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, pt. I, ch. I, art. 1, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295; 
see also Franzese, supra note 86, at 23-24. 
141 Franzese, supra note 86, at 24. 
142 Franzese, supra note 86, at 24 (suggesting that the implicit solution was "to simply apply the Roman maxim ... 'he 
who owns the soil owns it up to the sky'"). 
143 Franzese, supra note 86, at 24; see also GYULA GAL, SPACE LAw 61-70 (1969). 
144 Franzese, supra note 86, at 24 (noting that despite these problems, the United States and Soviet Union, leaders in the 
space race in the late 1950s and early 19602, continued to support the notion that state sovereignty extended into outer 
space). 
145 KISH, supra note 114, at 82. 
146 KISH, supra note 114, at 82. 
147 KISH, supra note 114, at 82. 
148 Tom James, Military Activities in Space: Law, Policy and the Expected Maturation of Tactically Relevant Space Control, 4 
ARMY SPACE]. 24, 25 (2005), http://www.smdcarmyforces.army.mil/Pic_Archive/ 
ASJ_PDFs/ASJ_ VOL_ 4_N0_2_Article_5.pdf. 
149 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, art. II, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410. 
15° Franzese, supra note 86, at 26-27; see also Peter A. Dutton, China's Views of Sovereignty and Methods of Access Control 
(Feb. 27, 2008), http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2008hearings/written_ testimonies/08_02_27 _ wrts/08_02_27 _dutton_ 
statement. php. 
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ful purposes, it is used for military purposes such as intelligence collection and communications. 151 
"There is no blanket prohibition in international law on placing or using weapons in Space, applying 
force from Space to Earth or conducting military operations in and through Space." 152 State practice 
has made it clear that peaceful purposes can-and do-include some military operations. 153 
Cyberspace has been likened to the domain of space: 154 
"Space and cyber are cross-cutting domains, enabling the three other finite spatial do-
mains through faster decision making. The domains are global in scope and indiffer-
ent to physical terrain or lines drawn on a map with near instantaneous effects trans-
mitted through their domains. Both cyber and space are global commons vital to civil 
and commercial activities and essential to the economy and military operations." 155 
One major difference, however, is the ease of accessibility of cyberspace versus space. A Mas-
ter's thesis from 1965 once asked: "where is space? [W]ho controls it?" 156 These are the same ques-
tions that we ask today about cyberspace. 
C Sovereignty in Cyberspace 
Cyberspace needs the rule of law inherent in sovereignty, but it needs to be open for inter-
national transit. ''As with maritime trade, the path to future prosperity relies on open access, engage-
ment and cooperation among friends and allies in the global cyberspace commons." 157 Although 
similar to space, cyberspace cannot be a true global commons "governed collectively for the common 
benefit of all mankind,'' 158 effectively prohibiting State sovereignty. The great number of people 
and companies in cyberspace need rules and regulations that only a sovereign can provide. This 
new domain needs a navigational regime like the Law of the Sea that carefully balances the needs of 
national security but ensures international freedoms. 159 "It must recognize that the Internet is part of 
an international telecommunications system where freedom of access benefits all States, and to which 
any artificially drawn boundaries would have to be consistent with legitimate issues of national sover-
eignty and customary international law." 160 A regime of "transit passage" can strike this balance. 
151 Robert W Jarman, The Law of Neutrality in Outer Space (Sep. 8, 2008) (unpublished LL. M. Thesis, McGill 
University) (on file with author), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a485937.pd£ 
152 James, supra note 148, at 55. 
153 Schaap, supra note 17, at 162. 
154 David M. Franklin, U.S. Command Relationships in the Conduct ofCyber Warfare: Establishment, Exercise, and 
Institutionalization of Cyber Coordinating Authority 10 (May 3, 2010) (unpublished paper) (on file with the Naval War 
College), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a52527 4.pd£ 
155 Franklin, supra note 154 at 10. 
156 Carl E. Buchmann, Space Law: State Responsibility for Spacecraft Damages and for the Return of Personnel and 
Equipment 1 (1965) (unpublished thesis, The Judge Advocate General's School, United States Army) (on file with The 
Judge Advocate General's Legal Center & School Library). 
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the Realm of Cyberspace, 48 NAVAL L. REv. 58, 63 (2001). 
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i. Utopian Beginnings 
In the 1990s, John Perry Barlow, lyrics writer for the Grateful Dead, advocated for a separate 
legal regime for cyberspace, totally outside of state control. 161 Barlow and others believed that cy-
berspace was "a new frontier, where people lived in peace, under their own rules, liberated from the 
constraints of an oppressive society and free from government meddling." 162 After President Clinton 
signed the Communications Decency Act into law, Barlow wrote his famous Declaration of Cyber-
space Independence, based on the Declaration of Independence, and distributed it widely. 163 
"Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from 
Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to 
leave us alone ... You have no sovereignty where we gather. We have no elected govern-
ment, nor are we likely to have one ... Our identities have no bodies, so, unlike you, 
we cannot obtain order by physical coercion. We believe that from ethics, enlightened 
self-interest, and the commonweal, our governance will emerge. Our identities may 
be distributed across many of your jurisdictions ... We will create a civilization of the 
Mind in Cyberspace. May it be more humane and fair than the world your govern-
ments have made before." 164 
"The belief that cyberspace should be free from government interference, or sovereignty, led 
to the idea that cyberspace is, in fact, immune from state sovereignty." 165 However, this ideal has 
become very unrealistic. Although cyberspace was once believed to be free from government control 
and regulation, States are being to exert their control over cyberspace in order to ensure liberty. 166 As 
a result, sovereignty needs to apply in cyberspace. "We build a world where freedom can flourish not 
by removing from society any self-conscious control, but by setting it in a place where a particular 
kind of self-conscious control survives." 167 States will have to want to exert sovereignty in cyberspace 
and in order to do this there will have to be borders in cyberspace. How States construct these 
borders is another matter. 168 
161 GOLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 40, at 17; see also Franzese, supra note 86, at 11-12. 
162 GOLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 40, at 13. 
163 GOLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 40, at 19-20 (explaining that the Communications Decency Act "punished all 
transmission of'indecent' sexual communications or images on the Internet 'in a manner available to a person under 18 
years of age"'). 
164 John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of Independence for Cyberspace (Feb. 8, 1996), http://www.homes.efforg/-barlow/ 
Declaration-Final.html. 
165 Franzese, supra note 86, at 11. 
166 LESSIG, supra note 65, at 3. 
167 LESSIG, supra note 65, at 4. 
168 See Forrest Hare, Borders in Cyberspace: Can Sovereignty Adapt to the Challenges of Cyber Security, THE VIRTUAL 
BATTLEFIELD: PERSPECTIVES ON CYBER WARFARE 88, 101-03 (Christian Czosseck & Kenneth Geers eds., 2009), http:// 
ccd.coe.org/publications/virtualbattlefield/06_HARE_Borders%20in%20Cyberspace.pd£ 
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ii. The Taming of Cyberspace 
Over the last decade, States have begun exerting their sovereignty in cyberspace in response 
to complaints from its citizens and a need to control the information seen by those citizens. Western 
States have exerted control on content or access to content in order to protect their citizens from 
child pornography, sale of Nazi paraphernalia, and other ills. 169 States have also had to regulate con-
tent on the Internet in order to safeguard intellectual property. Repressive states such as China and 
Belarus have constructed barriers to access in an effort to keep western ideals of democracy from its 
citizens' purview on the Internet. 170 
As far back as 1995, the Germans prosecuted the German manager of CompuServe 
Deutschland for "failing to prevent child pornography, much of which came from outside Germany, 
from reaching German citizens." 171 Regulating local Internet Service Providers (ISPs) is a key to 
States controlling what content its citizens can view on the Internet. Once notified of the existence of 
illegal content, German, British, and French laws require their local ISPs to screen out the offending 
content. 172 This protects the citizens of those States, but it does not stop the offending content from 
transiting the States' cyberspace. 
Prior to 2000, it was believed that a State could not control an Internet provider in another 
State. 173 In a landmark decision, the French courts held that Yahoo, a United States corporation, 
violated French law by allowing Nazi paraphernalia to appear for sale on web pages accessible in 
France. 174 Acknowledging that a one hundred percent blockage was impossible, the court "ordered 
Yahoo to make a 'reasonable effort' to block French users." 175 France was not blocking the websites 
from its cyberspace, but it was erecting a border around its citizens whom it wanted to protect from 
the Nazi goods being sold. 
Although China allows access to the Internet, it has carefully engineered accessible con-
tent. China "is trying to create an Internet that is free enough to support and maintain the world's 
fastest growing economy, and yet closed enough to tamp down political threats to its monopoly on 
power." 176 In order to accomplish this goal, China has created a "firewall" popularly known as the 
"Great Firewall of China'' around its people that filters and removes any unapproved information 
headed to a Chinese national. 177 In 2002, Yahoo signed the Public Pledge on Self-Discipline far the 
Chinese Internet Industry, which requires that "Yahoo filter materials that might be harmful or threat-
169 See GOLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 40, at 154-57. 
170 See GOLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 40, at 87-104; ACCESS CONTROLLED: THE SHAPING OF PowER, RIGHTS, AND RuLE 
IN CYBERSPACE 161-69, 449-73 (Ronald Deibert et al. eds., 2010); LESSIG, supra note 65, at 79-80, 308; see generally 
Fyodor Pavlyuchenko, Belarus in the Context of European Cyber Security, THE VIRTUAL BATTLEFIELD: PERSPECTIVES ON 
CYBER WARFARE 156, 156-62 (Christian Czosseck & Kenneth Geers eds., Kenneth Geers trans. 2009), http:ccd.coe.org/ 
publications/virtual battlefield/ l l_P AVLYUCHENKO _Belorussia. pdf (censorship). 
171 GOLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 40, at 73. 
172 GOLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 40, at 73. 
173 GOLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 40, at r-ro. 
174 GOLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 40, at 7-8. 
175 GOLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 40, at 8. 
176 GOLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 40, at 89. 
177 GOLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 40, at 92-93 (outlining the process by which the "Great Firewall of China'' filters 
unapproved internet information); ACCESS CONTROLLED, supra note 170, at 4. 
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ening to Party rule." 178 These processes, however, do not prevent the data from actually entering 
China. Thus, determined savvy Internet users are able to circumvent most, if not all, of these barriers 
with relative ease. 179 
E-commerce requires a stable environment controlled by a sovereign who can protect 
companies and consumers from fraud. Pierre Omidyar, founder of eBay, desired to make a company 
self-regulated by its users, but "quickly learned that to prevent fraud, enforce its contracts, and ensure 
stability in its auction services, it would depend critically on government coercion and the rule of law 
provided by a stable country like the United States." 180 Originally run by community enforcement, 
eBay now has a full-time security staff of over eight hundred people. 181 
States are creating boundaries in cyberspace to protect its citizens, rather than its 
territory. Cyber crimes are being prosecuted by States regardless of the fact that the person was not 
physically within the State's territory when accessing the Internet. The United States prosecutes a 
man who views child pornography on the Internet while physically being in another country by us-
ing extra-territorial jurisdiction. 182 "Developing sovereignty, [however,] ultimately requires an inter-
national regime with specific rules and procedures regulating state activity in that domain, including 
a requirement to identify and track transnational actors." 183 
iii. A Navigational Regime for Cyberspace - Transit Passage 
As with the domains of sea, air, and space, there is a need for international space in cyber-
space. ''And like the seas, the U.S. will feel the need to maintain 'freedom of navigation' in cyber-
space as a primary beneficiary of its existence." 184 The networks of cyberspace need to be kept "open 
for the economic, social, and security interests of this country and its citizens." 185 Cyberspace has 
provided an information-based revolution in the public, private, and military sectors. 186 
This domain, however, is very different from the other physical domains. A State may not 
even be aware of someone in their cyberspace. Cyber operations occur "at computing speeds deliv-
ered at the speed oflight." 187 In order to physically enter a State, a traveler must present a passport; 
yet a cyber traveler can enter any State in cyberspace without any documents. This freedom is not 
something that we want to stop with the recognition of sovereignty in cyberspace. Therefore, inter-
national law needs to adopt a regime for cyberspace that allows for the free flow of electrons through 
all of cyberspace. 
178 GOLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 40, at 9. 
179 GOLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 40, at 103; ACCESS CONTROLLED, supra note 170, at 4. 
180 GOLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 40, at 129. 
181 See GOLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 40, at 129-135. 
182 LESSIG, supra note 65, at 299. 
183 Franzese, supra note 86, at 34 (emphasizing that because cyberspace is man-made, it is necessarily influenced by 
politics and shaped by social actions and institutions); see also Geoffrey L. Herrera, Cyberspace and Sovereignty: Thoughts 
on Physical Space and Digital Space (Mar. 22, 2006),http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p98069_index.html. 
184 Matus, supra note 5, at 33 (noting that this issues will require "significant strategic changes to U.S. national security). 
185 Huntley, supra note 18, at 2 (asserting that, in order to keep these cyberspace networks open, the United States must 
also conduct operations in cyberspace). 
186 Sorensen, supra note 8, at 56. 
187 Sorensen, supra note 8, at 52. 
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An international strait is a fitting analogy for Cyberspace, which has an extremely high 
volume of traffic that is exponentially growing. 188 "For cyberspace capabilities, like e-mail, the utility 
of the tool to each user increases exponentially as the number of people using the tool increases." 189 
Therefore, it is in society's interest to keep this traffic in cyberspace free flowing, like the desire to 
keep the high volume of traffic transiting an international strait. There are no clear borders in cyber-
space. Once a packet of information is launched into cyberspace, it is nearly impossible to tell when 
it passes from one sovereign to another until it finally arrives. ''Although every computer, server, 
and wire is located in some place subject to other regulatory frameworks, the paths by which pack-
ets travel across the Internet are largely beyond the control of the user and may pass through many 
different sovereign jurisdictions in route from senders to recipient." 190 In an international strait, the 
territorial seas of more than one State overlap. The public and freely accessible parts of cyberspace are 
like international straits connecting the sovereign territories where the hardware is located. 
"[T] ransit passage allows all ships and aircraft freedom of navigation and overflight solely for 
the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the international strait between one part of the 
high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic 
zone." 191 Cyberspace absolutely requires this type of framework in order not to disrupt the flow of 
ideas and commerce in cyberspace. "Transit passage" would allow the electrons to transit cyberspace 
in their normal mode of operation. No State could suspend transit passage of its cyberspace; but if it 
so chose, it could disconnect from the network. In addition, transit passage would apply to military 
operations and would allow for the transit passage through a neutral territory. The hardware, how-
ever, is actually in sovereign territory. The relationship between the physical hardware and cyberspace 
is similar to that of territorial waters and the high seas. 
"Every component of every information and telecommunications network around the 
world, under the sea, and in the air is subject to proprietary interests - whether that 
of a private company, a sovereign government, or possibly both. Each copper wire, 
fiber-optic cable, microwave relay tower, satellite transponder, or Internet router has 
been produced or installed by some entity whose legal successors not only maintain 
ownership of that physical asset but also expect protection of the same by sovereign 
authorities." 192 
Recognizing a right of "transit passage" in cyberspace would merely make current State prac-
tice customary international law. Every day, States violate the sovereignty of other States as emails 
from one office transit across national boundaries in route to the office next door. Because of the way 
the Internet operates, one message can be broken up into multiple packets that travel the public In-
ternet in the most expeditious manner regardless of path. Cyberspace knows no boundaries; packets 
do not request permission when transiting from one State to another. 
188 Sorensen, supra note 8, at 51. 
189 Sorensen, supra note 8, at 58; see also Bob Briscoe, Andrew Odlyzko, and Benjamin Tilly, Metca/fi's Law is Wrong, 
IEEE SPECTRUM (July 2006), http://spectrum.ieee.org/ computing/ networks/ metcalfes-law-iswrong. 
190 Ryan et al., supra note 76, at 89. 
191 Barney, supra note 159, at 75. 
192 Kanuck, supra note 20, at 1573. 
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Private password protected networks in cyberspace should be treated as internal waters, where 
complete territorial sovereignty is imposed. Information from unauthorized users on these networks 
would violate territorial sovereignty. The Department of Defense's Secret Internet Protocol Router 
Network (SIPRNET) would be one example of such network. This type of regime would balance 
society's need for freedom of navigation of cyberspace while protecting national security. 
Sovereignty in cyberspace is required and States will need to exert this sovereignty. It is 
imperative that States police crime, protect property interest, and take action against known attacks 
originating within its cyberspace. 193 Global society is heavily reliant on the Internet's continuing 
functionality, which requires packets to continue surfing freely through cyberspace. In addition, 
States cannot currently exert territorial control over the electrons passing through its cyberspace; 
therefore, there is no way to enforce exclusive sovereignty in cyberspace. Consequently, States should 
operate in cyberspace, assuming a right of "transit passage,'' and, with time, the practice will become 
a part of customary international law. 
IV. APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT TO CYBERSPACE 
The governance of cyberspace will require the utilization of all types of law, such as criminal 
law, tort law, and property law. Since cyberspace interconnects global society, it most assuredly will 
require international law. As long as cyberwar is possible, the international body of law known as the 
law of armed conflict194 will apply to cyberspace. 
A. Applying the Law of Armed Conflict to Cyberspace 
Over the last decade, great scholars have debated whether the law of armed conflict (LOAC) 
should apply to cyberspace, and the majority consensus agrees that it should. 195 The pivotal question, 
193 See generally Matthew]. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to Cyberattacks: A justification for the Use 
of Active Defenses Against States Who Neglect Their Duty to Prevent, 201 MIL. L. REv. 1, 1-76 (2009) (arguing for an 
obligation on States to take action against attacks originating within its borders or be subject to attack by the victim 
state). 
194 The "law of armed conflict" refers to the same body oflaws that was commonly referred to as the "law of war." Some 
argue the more contemporary term is actually "international humanitarian law." See GARY D. Sous, THE LAw OF ARMED 
CONFLICT 21-22 (20ro). 
195 Neil C. Rowe, Ethics ofCyberwar Attacks, CYBER WAR AND CYBER TERRORISM 105, 106 (A. Colarik & L. Janczewski 
eds., 2008), http://faculty.nps.edu/ncrowe/attackethics.htm; Huntley, supra note 18, at 14; Davis Brown, A Proposal 
for an International Convention to Regulate the Use of Information Systems in Armed Conflict, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 179, 
181 (2006); TIKK ET AL., supra note 18, at 79-80; Stuart H. Starr, Towards an Evolving Theory ofCyberpower, THE 
VIRTUAL BATTLEFIELD: PERSPECTIVES ON CYBER WARFARE 18, 41 (Christian Czosseck & Kenneth Geers eds., 2009), 
http://ccd.coe.org/publications/virtualbattlefield/02_STARR_ Cyberpower. pdf; see generally Michael N. Schmitt, 
Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 CoLUM. 
]. TRANSNAT'L L. 885, 885-937 (1999) (leading analysis to determine if a cyber attack amounts to use of force); SHARP, 
SR., supra note 2 (competing theory for analyzing a cyber attack looking at "sufficient scope, duration, and intensity''); 
THOMAS c. WINGFIELD & ]AMES B. MICHAEL, NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, NPS-CS-04-005, AN INTRODUCTION 
TO LEGAL AsPECTS OF OPERATIONS IN CYBERSPACE ro-12 (April 28, 2004), http://dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a422696.pdf 
(comparing quantitative and qualitative approaches); Knut Dormann, Applicability of the Additional Protocols to Computer 
Network Attacks, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 1-7 (Nov. 19, 2004), http://www.icrc.org/eng/assts/files/other/ 
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then, is whether a cyberattack is an act of war. 196 "The presence-or absence-of a state of armed 
conflict carries significance, because during armed conflict the actions of belligerents are usually gov-
erned by the law of war, not the more - restrictive rules applicable to law enforcement situations." 197 
The discomfort in applying LOAC to cyberspace stems from the fact that this body of law-
obviously-did not contemplate cyberspace. 198 Therefore, law of armed conflict does not directly 
apply to cyberspace and does not take into account all of the differences between cyberwarfare and 
traditional kinetic warfare; instead, it must be applied through analogy. 199 In addition, Additional 
Protocol I of the Geneva Convention extends the law of armed conflict to any new method of war-
fare. Additional Protocol I requires a State to review any "new weapon, means or method of warfare 
to ensure its employment would not violate international law. 200 
What activities in cyberspace constitute a threat or use of force is the subject of much debate. 
''At a point along the spectrum of interstate activities called the line of belligerency, a use of force by 
a state establishes an international armed conflict as a matter of law and the law of armed conflict 
applies."201 ]us ad bellum is this body of international law, found in both customary and treaty law, 
governing a State's resort to force against another state. 202 The UN Charter is the primary modern 
source of jus ad bellum. 203 In accordance with the UN Charter, "all members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political in-
dependence of any state."204 In order to know what activities between states are forbidden in cyber-
space, we must know what activities constitute the threat or use of force in cyberspace. In Article 51, 
the UN Charter offers that "nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individ-
ual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until 
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."205 
Humanity must determine what an armed attack is in cyberspace in order to know when a state has a 
right to protect itself. ''Although a state never loses its right to use force in self-defense [under Article 
51] in response to a use of force within the meaning of Article 2(4), the right of self-defense under 
customary international law may not always justify an armed response." 206 
applicabilityofihltocna.pdf(applying international humanitarian law); Dunlap, supra note 21, at 81-95 (arguing basic 
tenets of LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT are sufficient to address cyberwar); Todd, supra note 3, at 66-102 (arguing for 
a definition-based approach); David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the Law o/War, 4]. NAT'L SEC. L. & Pm'y 87, 87-102 
(2010) (comparing different approaches). 
196 Starr, supra note 195, at 24. 
197 Dunlap, supra note 21, at 88. 
198 Dunlap, supra note 21, at 82. 
199 Compare Huntley, supra note 18, at 14, and Wolfgang McGavran, Intended Consequences: Regulating Cyber Attacks, 
12 Tm.]. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 259, 269 (2009), with Hollis, supra note 18, at 1029, andVida M. Antolin-Jenkins, 
Defining the Parameters of Cyberwar Operations: Looking for Law in All the Wrong Places?, 51 NAVAL L. REv. 132, 134 (2005) 
(both arguing Law of Armed Conflict can be applied by analogy to cyberwarfare, but poorly). 
200 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 36, June 8, 1977, 1125 UNT.S. 3. 
201 SHARP, SR., supra note 2, at 9; see also Wingfield & Michael, supra note 195, at 10. 
202 Schmitt, supra note 195, at 886. 
203 Huntley, supra note 18, at 15. 
204 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
205 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
206 SHARP, SR., supra note 2, at 54. 
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B. Defining the Use of Force/Armed Attack in Cyberspace 
Without defining any of the terms individually, the UN Charter uses the terms "use of 
force,'' "armed attack,'' and "aggression" in its various provisions, spurring over fifty years of debate 
about the terms' meanings. 207 Although economic and political coercion can threaten international 
stability, generally the use of force is understood to mean armed force. 208 "Until the advent of in-
formation operations, most coercion could be handily categorized into one of several boxes, for few 
options existed that could not be typed as political, economic, or armed in nature."209 Cyber attacks, 
however, do not fit neatly into any of these categories. Cyber attacks are launched for a multitude of 
reasons with a wide spectrum of effects. Therefore, it had to be determined "whether a cyber attack, 
because it does not involve the use of kinetic force, is a prohibited use of force under the Charter and 
customary international law."210 Michael N. Schmitt analyzed this and answered it in the affirmative, 
stating "the key is to move from an instrument-based paradigm (economics, politics, kinetic military 
force) to one based on the consequences caused by the action."211 To help analyze the consequences 
of an operation, Schmitt developed seven criteria to determine whether the effects are "more like 
those caused by economic and political coercion or by physical coercion."212 
In defining the use of force in cyberspace, most scholars look to the seven-factor analysis 
proposed by Michael N. Schmitt to determine a use of force. 213 These factors include: severity, im-
mediacy, directness, invasiveness, measurability, presumptive legitimacy, and State responsibility214 
and give a qualitative analysis of how military operations differ from nonmilitary operations, such 
as diplomatic and economic coercion.215 The use of force does not include non-physical means of 
psychological, political or economic warfare." 216 
The next major law of armed conflict issue is evaluating when a cyber attack amounts to an 
"armed attack'' under Article 51, allowing a State to respond with force in self-defense.217 The previ-
ous analysis is not applicable in this determination, because "use of force" and "armed attack'' is not 
the same.218 Typically, cyber attacks with violent effects are the legally equivalent to armed attacks. 219 
Therefore, cyber attacks utilizing cyber weapons (e.g., viruses, worms, logic bombs) and resulting 
in human suffering or property damage (beyond the computer program or data attacked) can be 
207 Antolin-Jenkins, supra note 199, at 150; SHARP, SR., supra note 2, at 73. 
208 Schmitt, supra note 195, at 908. 
209 Schmitt, supra note 195, at 908. 
210 Michael N. Schmitt, The Sixteenth Waldemar A. Sol/Lecture in International Law, 176 M1L. L. REv. 364, 416 (2003). 
211 Id. at 417. 
212 Id. (putting forth a model for assessing cyber operations). 
213 See Dormann, supra note 195, at 1 (noting that this analysis considers the jus in bello context, particularly the 
consequences arising from the principle of distinction); see also Rowe, supra note 195, at 106. 
214 Schmitt, supra note 210, at 417. 
215 WINGFIELD, supra note 195, at 11 (using the factors to "grade" operations to determine whether they qualify as a use 
of force). 
216 See Dormann, supra note 195, at 4 (explaining that "acts of violence" implies physical force, thereby excluding 
dissemination of propaganda and embargoes, for example). 
217 See Schmitt, supra note 210, at 418-19. 
218 Id. at 419 (referencing the Nicaragua decision to distinguish the terms). 
219 Dunlap, supra note 21, at 86. 
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considered "armed attacks."220 Although some cyber events, such as spamming a state or modify-
ing a state's website, may be damaging and seem to equate to an "armed attack,'' they may not be 
sufficiently egregious or may lack the required violence to authorize the use of force in response.221 
The law of armed conflict will also generally not apply if there is no state attribution of the cyber at-
tack. 222 States will ordinarily utilize criminal law to respond to these attacks.223 Most cyber operations 
will not rise to the level of an "armed attack'' and will only be interventions into the internal affairs 
of another state.224 If the law of armed conflict will rarely apply in cyberspace, then the same is true 
for the law of neutrality. In those instances, however, where there is an international armed conflict 
and the law of armed conflict does apply, States need to know their obligations under the law of 
neutrality. 
V. NEUTRALITY 
The designers created the Internet, as implied by its name, to be a single network to link 
data across States and oceans.225 In reality, the Internet is a multitude of different linked networks. 226 
Therefore, there is no way to predict the State or States through which a packet will travel during 
transmission. 227 A belligerent cannot know which route its cyber attack will take on its way to its 
target, which makes it impossible to ensure that it does not cross a neutral's cyberspace territory. 228 
In a cyberwar, how a State remains neutral has been the subject of much discourse. The 
primary question is whether an electron from a belligerent State crossing through a neutral State's cy-
berspace territory is a violation of the law of neutrality.229 Another question is whether a neutral State 
is required to take action against a belligerent electron transiting its cyberspace. "More than a century 
after the Hague Conventions' enactment, their general conception of neutrality remains controlling 
law, but international law does not explicitly address cyberattacks and cyber neutrality."230 This paper 
argues that an electron passing through a neutral's State's cyberspace does not violate the neutral's 
sovereignty and should not require action by the neutral State.231 Since it appears that there is not go-
220 Dormann, supra note 195, at 4. 
221 See Dunlap, supra note 21, at 86 (recognizing the importance of neutrally assessing the consequences of a cyber 
incident to see if it rises to the equivalent level of an armed attack); see also Rowe, supra note 195, at 1. 
222 TIKK ET AL., supra note 18, at 99. 
223 TIKK ET AL., supra note 18, at 99. 
224 Antolin-Jenkins, supra note 199, at 172; Huntley, supra note 18, at 2-3 (implying that certain principles of 
international law do little to control states in cyberspace). 
225 Kelsey, supra note 28, at I432. 
226 Kelsey, supra note 28, at I432 ("Keeping with its military roots, the Internet has a significant level of redundancy in 
the backbone, such that if one network experiences a problem the Internet can reroute traffic in real time to avoid it."). 
227 See Kelsey, supra note 28, at I432. 
228 See LESSIG, supra note 65, at 63. 
229 John S. Fredland, Building a Better Cybersecurity Act: Empowering the Executive Branch Against Cybersecurity 
Emergencies, 206 MIL. L. REv. 1, 14 (2010) (reflecting that neutrality law is notoriously difficult to predict and 
cyberconflicts have further complicated the U.S. position on neutrality in international conflicts). 
230 See id. 
231 Compare SHARP, supra note 2, at 112-I3; (commenting that a neutral State does not have to prohibit a belligerent 
from utilizing its telecommunications infrastructure), and TIKK ET AL., supra note 18, at 83 (suggesting that data 
flow through private infrastructure does not violate neutrality), and MICHAEL N. SCHMITT, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL 
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ing to be any new international agreements written for cyberspace in the near future, it is imperative 
to interpret the existing rules in the most appropriate fashion. "Because international law imposes a 
dramatically different legal status on states that enter conflicts between other states as a belligerent, 
compared with states electing to remain neutral, the choice between belligerency and neutrality rep-
resents one of the most significant responsibilities for a sovereign's national security decision-making 
b d "232 0 y. 
A. The Law of Neutrality 
The law of neutrality embodied in the Hague Conventions is basically as old as time, in 
the sense it is based on basic economic principles. Neutrals want to stay out of war and yet want to 
protect their commerce and trade routes. Belligerents need resources, which neutrals have. Since the 
law of neutrality has endured with little change through all of the technological revolutions of the 
last several centuries, there is no reason to believe the same law will not apply in cyberspace, where 
commerce along with communication is paramount. 
i. History of Neutrality 
As early as the fourteenth century and possibly even earlier, "neutrality'' was applied in its 
modern sense. 233 Since at least the fifteenth century, a prime objective of belligerents was the destruc-
tion of the enemy's trade, which appears to have led to the law of neutral rights at sea. 234 
The problem has always been the reconciliation of the incompatible interests of neu-
trals and belligerents, or, rather, a compromise between these irreconcilable interests. 
The neutral has sought to maintain his freedom of trade; the belligerent has sought 
to cut off all supplies from his enemy. The desire to seize goods of the enemy may be 
HUMANITARIAN LAw RESEARCH INITIATIVE, COMPUTERS AND WAR: THE LEGAL BATTLESPACE I5 (2004), (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard University), http://www.hpcrresearch. 
org/sites/default/files/publications/schmittetal.pdf (asserting the mere routing of data through a neutral State is allowed), 
with LAWRENCE T. GREENBERG, ET AL., INFORMATION WARFARE AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 26-28 (I998) (stating that 
a cyberattack crossing through a neutral is a violation of that neutral's territory, but admitting the counter-argument 
that a cyberattack is not a physical encroachment and therefore not a violation), and Kelsey, supra note 28, at I44I-45 
(asserting that cyber attacks will violate neutrality by electrons crossing through neutral territory, but also admitting to 
counter-argument), and Korns & Kastenberg, supra note 26, at 62 (proposing that a neutral State is required to take 
action against a cyber attack transiting through its Internet), and Joshua E Kastenberg, supra note 26, at 53 (relying on 
the previous reference and asserting without support that the international law community is coalescing around the 
principle that a cross-border cyber attack violates the principle of neutrality since the electrons are likely to pass though 
the cyberspace of neutral States), and Fredland, supra note 229, at 12-13 (arguing that neutral States must take action 
against cyber attacks passing through their Internet). 
232 Fredland, supra note 230, at 12. 
233 PHILIP C. JESSUP & FRANCIS DEAK, NEUTRALITY: ITs HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND LAw, VoL. I: THE ORIGINS 3-4 
(I976) (citing examples of rules and rights that implicated "neutrality'' within a society of nations). 
234 Id. at xi. 
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ascribed to either or both of two purposes: (I) weakening the enemy by striking at both 
his import and export trade and thus contributing to his defeat; (2) obtaining supplies 
of which the capturing state is in need. 235 
27 
According to writings from the fifteenth through eighteenth centuries, it is believed that this 
is how the law of neutrality developed, rather than from a principle that neutrals do not render aid 
to belligerents.236 Resources required by belligerents have served neutral states well through time. 237 
Although neutrals have long complained about breaches of the law of neutrality, it appears through 
history that these neutral States have netted far more gains than losses. 238 
ii. 1907 Hague Convention V 
The Hague Convention V Respecting The Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons 
in Case of War on Land and in the Hague Convention XII Concerning the Rights and Duties of 
Neutral Powers in Naval War embody the international law on neutrality. 239 Per the tides of these 
conventions, they apply in the case of war. Therefore, there must be an international armed con-
flict in order for the law of neutrality to apply. 240 Hague Convention III Relative To the Opening of 
Hostilities governs the beginning of hostilities. With regards to neutral states, Hague Convention III 
states: 
The existence of a state of war must be notified to the neutral Powers without delay, 
and shall not take effect in regard to them until after the receipt of a notification, which 
may, however, be given by telegraph. Neutral Powers, nevertheless, cannot rely on the 
absence of notification if it is clearly established that they were in fact aware of the 
existence of a state of war.241 
These provisions will limit the application of neutrality law to cyberwarfare. Thus far, no 
States have taken responsibility for any cyber attacks. 
In circumstances where a cyber attack rises to the level of a cyberwar, 242 the States involved 
in the conflict would need to be identified. In accordance with Hague Convention III, the parties to 
conflict would need to notify neutral States. Until that time, a neutral State would not be bound by 
the obligations of Hague Convention V, unless they should have known about the conflict. Even if a 
cyber attack is deemed an "armed attack,'' generally the identity of the attacker is unknown. In such 
235 Id. at xii. 
236 Id. 
237 Id. at xiii. (proving that a neutral may not be defenseless simply because its army or navy is small). 
238 See PHILIP C. JESSUP & FRANCIS DEAK, at xiii. 
239 Hague Convention V Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land of 
18 October 1907, art. 2 [hereinafter Hague VJ. 
240 See TIKK ET AL., supra note 18, at 83. 
241 Hague Convention III Relative to the Opening of Hostilities of 18 October 1907, art. 2 (recalling a cyberwar would 
trigger the Hague Conventions). 
242 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
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a situation, the law of neutrality would not apply because the neutral State would not be on notice of 
an armed conflict. 
When there is an actual international armed conflict in cyberspace, Hague Convention V 
governs the rights and duties of neutral States. The movement of troops or convoys of either muni-
tions of war or supplies by belligerents across the territory of a neutral state is forbidden. 243 Bellig-
erents are forbidden from erecting wireless telegraphy stations or other apparatus for the purpose of 
communicating with belligerent forces on land or sea on the territory of a neutral state. 244 They are 
further prohibited from using any of such stations erected prior to the war on the territory of a neu-
tral state for purely military purposes, unless it has been opened for the service of public messages. 245 
These prohibitions apply only to direct communications by belligerents to their forces. 246 A neutral 
State has a responsibility to prohibit such activity from being conducted on its territory.247 Certainly, 
belligerents may not launch an attack from within the telecommunication infrastructure of a neutral 
State.248 There is an exception, however, to this principle of information warfare. 
a. Telegraph Exception 
A neutral State is allowed to let belligerents use telegraph or telephone cables or wireless 
telegraphy apparatus belonging to the neutral State or its nationals. 249 The neutral State does, how-
ever, have to ensure any restrictions or prohibitions are applied impartially to both belligerents. 250 
The same applies for private infrastructure systems.251 If this is the case, a belligerent may utilize the 
State's telecommunications infrastructure and equipment.252 The level of State activism by the neu-
tral, though, may range; the greater the degree of activism, the more likely it is a neutral State will vi-
olate its duties under the law of neutrality. 253 It is one thing for private companies of a neutral State 
to conduct commerce with a belligerent State, and another for the State itself to assist a belligerent.254 
As long as a neutral State impartially makes its networks available to both sides, there is no reason 
243 Hague Convention V Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land of 
18 October 1907, art. 2 [hereinafter Hague VJ. 
244 Id. art. 3(a). 
245 Id. art. 3(b). 
246 Brown, supra note 195, at 208. 
247 Hague V, supra note 243, at art. 5. 
248 Schmitt et al., supra note 231, at 15. 
249 Hague V, supra note 243, at art. 8. 
250 Id. art. 9. 
251 Brown, supra note 195, at 208 (explaining why there is no duty on neutral states to restrict belligerents from using 
its own communications systems or privately owned systems, so long as the neutral state and the privately owned systems 
are impartial). 
252 TIKK ET AL., supra note 18, at 83. 
253 TIKK ET AL., supra note 18, at 83 (stating the more active a State is in helping a belligerent, the more likely it is 
violating the law of neutrality); see infta Part VI. 
254 TIKK ET AL., supra note 18, at 83; see generally L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw A TREATISE VoL. II: DISPUTES, 
WAR AND NEUTRALITY 673-759 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952). 
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why the mere passage of electrons through a neutral state would violate neutrality. 255 "The smaller 
the degree of state activism, the less there is reason to speak of the state violating neutrality."256 
b. Law of the Seas "Peaceful Passage" 
Hague Convention XIII governs the rights and duties of neutral States in naval war.257 The 
provisions are similar to those on land, but "the neutrality of a Power is not affected by the mere 
passage through its territorial waters of war-ships or prizes belonging to belligerents."258 Belligerent 
war-ships can remain in a port or territorial water of a neutral state for up to twenty-four hours. 259 
In addition to Hague XIII, the Law of the Sea Convention provides more guidance to 
neutrals and belligerents in regards to the different navigational regimes. 260 In international straits, 
it protects the right of transit passage, even through neutral straits. 261 Belligerent forces transiting a 
neutral international strait must refrain from hostile activities not incident to their transit, but they 
may "take defensive measures consistent with their security, including the launching and recovery 
of military devices, screen formation steaming, and acoustic and electronic surveillance, and may 
respond in self-defense to a hostile act or hostile intent." 262 Once again, analogizing cyberspace to an 
international strait results in a potentially practical rule for international law. 
Due to the way the Internet is structured, it is foolhardy to prohibit a cyber weapon to peace-
fully pass through a neutral State's cyberspace. In most situations, the neutral State will not even 
know that the electrons passed through its sovereignty.263 Nor is there much the State can do, short 
of severing all computer connections with other States. 
B. Responsibility of a Neutral 
Some scholars argue that a neutral must keep electrons from a belligerent from transiting its 
cyberspace.264 These same scholars suggest that a neutral will lose its protected status if it fails to meet 
this impossible burden. 
Under this rule, if a neutral state cannot or does not take action to halt a cyber attack, 
a belligerent may choose to counter by physically attacking the neutral state's commu-
255 SCHMITT ET AL., supra note 231, at 15 (adding that if a neutral state does not act impartially, the "victim'' belligerent 
may take necessary and proportionate steps to end the violation). 
256 T1KK ET AL., supra note 18, at 83. 
257 Hague Convention XIII Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War of 18 October 1907. 
258 Hague Convention, supra note 257, art. 10. 
259 Hague Convention, supra note 257, art. 12. 
26° COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 121, at 7-4. 
261 COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 121, at 7-4 (caveating the idea that a neutral nation may suspend passage of 
belligerent warships through its territorial seas). 
262 COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 121, at 7-4. 
263 See Kelsey, supra note 28, at 1444-45 (considering the scope of the duty of neutrality; specifically, whether neutral 
states hold the practical methods of detecting a cyber attack),. 
264 Kastenberg, supra note 26, at 56 ("A surrender of neutrality or acquiescence to belligerent activity may draw a neutral 
state into the conflict."). 
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nications infrastructure. Thus, even without the physical violation of a neutral state's 
territory, a cyber attack may force a neutral state to become unwillingly involved. 265 
Why should we espouse such an impossible burden on neutrals? Nothing in the Hague 
Conventions suggests that a State must defend against anything less than a physical invasion of its 
territory. The Hague Conventions allow for warships to pass through territorial waters of a neutral 
and for the usage of telecommunication infrastructure. Jeffrey Kelsey in Hacking into International 
Humanitarian Law: The Principle of Distinction and Neutrality in the Age of Cyber Warfare argues that 
the meaning of neutrality should evolve to an "intent-based view of neutrality'' so that neutrals are 
able to escape an impossible burden.266 "This view would not require the neutral state to take action 
to prevent the unintentional passage of the cyber weapons through its borders .... "267 This is the 
right answer, but international law already allows for this. 
It is an entirely different situation where a neutral State allows a belligerent to conduct at-
tacks from its cyberspace.268 In these cases, the neutral needs to aggressively pursue those committing 
these attacks or face attack upon its own network. A neutral must also ensure that its servers are not 
being used for command and control of belligerent fighters. In such a case, "the server might be a 
valid military target because it's being used for the communications or command and control of the 
enemy fighters in the areas of hostilities."269 ''Although every server has a physical location, the Inter-
net is not segmented along national borders, and the enemy may gain greater tactical advantage from 
a server hosted half way around the world than from one located right in the middle of hostilities.270 
Neutrals will have to remain vigilant that belligerents do not use the servers located in their 
sovereign territory for command and control, or face being subject to attack. International law, how-
ever, must acknowledge that cyberspace falls under the telegraph exception to the law of neutrality, 
allowing electrons to freely transit cyberspace. One must remember that the law of neutrality only 
applies in an actual international armed conflict in cyberspace. Just because there is an international 
armed conflict on the ground does not necessarily mean there is a conflict in cyberspace, trigger-
ing the law of neutrality. The next section applies these concepts to the cyber attacks on Georgia in 
2008. 
VI. CASE STUDY- CYBER ATTACKS ON GEORGIA (JULY/AUGUST 2008) 
In the summer of 2008, attacks on Georgian government websites coincided with an actual 
military ground conflict. 271 From July 18 to 20, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks hit the 
265 Kastenberg, supra note 26, at 56. 
266 Kelsey, supra note 28, at 1448-49 (requiring a showing that the belligerent intentionally directed cyber weapons 
through the Internet nodes of a neutral states). 
267 Kelsey, supra note 28, at 1449· 
268 SCHMITT ET AL., supra note 231, at 15 (recalling that belligerents are forbidden to launch attacks from a neutral 
territory). 
269 Bradbury, supra note 27, at 19. 
270 Bradbury, supra note 27, at 19. 
271 T1KK ET AL., supra note 18, at 67-68 (chronicling the Russian invasion into Georgia following a period of separatist 
provocations). 
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website for Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili.272 Distributed denial-of-service attacks seek to 
prevent individual users from using a computer resource, such as a website, by flooding the network 
with bogus requests. 273 After years of tension in the South Ossetia region of Georgia between the 
Georgian military and the Russian backed separatist forces, the Georgian government made a sur-
prise attack on the separatists.274 In retaliation on August 8, 2008,275 Russian tanks entered Georgian 
territory and a large-scale kinetic war began.276 Substantial DDoS attacks against a large number 
of Georgian websites, including government, education, news and media, banking and financial277 
began almost immediately.278 The Internet slowed to a crawl and websites were forced off-line.279 In 
addition, websites were hijacked and governmental websites were defaced.28° Cyber attacks contin-
ued to the end of August despite a cease-fire agreement on August 12, 2008 ending military opera-
tions.281 
Georgia, which depends on Russian and Turkish infrastructure for its Internet connectivity,282 
quickly moved critical websites to servers in the United States, Poland, and Estonia.283 These coun-
tries have better cyber security and were able to prevent an information blockade of Georgia.284 Pri-
vate U.S technology companies, unbeknownst to the United States government,285 allowed Georgia 
to use their servers for news and governmental services, not military operations.286 The Estonian gov-
ernment allowed the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to hang on a server in their country 
and the President of Poland hosted official press releases from the Georgian government on a section 
of their website.287 Contrary to Stephen Korns' and Joshua Kasten berg's assertions in Georgia's Cyber 
272 See Jose Nazario, Politically Motivated Denial of Service Attacks, THE VIRTUAL BATTLEFIELD: PERSPECTIVES ON CYBER 
WARFARE 163 (Christian Czosseck & Kenneth Geers eds., 2009), http://ccd.coe.org/publications/virtualbattlefield/12_ 
NAZARI0%20Politically%20Motivated%20DDoS.pd£Gadi; see also Evron, Battling Botnets and Online Mobs, 9 GEO. 
]. INT'L AFF. 121, 167 (2008). 
273 Jonathan A. Ophardt, Cyber Warfare and the Crime of Aggression: The Need for Individual Accountability on Tomorrow's 
Battlefield, 2010 DuKE L. & TECH. REv. 003 (explaining how DDoS attacks expose pre-existing vulnerabilities and 
deficiencies in the operating software). 
274 DR. K., supra note 31, at 237. 
27
5 DR. K., supra note 31, at 237. 
276 Nazario, supra note 272, at 6. 
277 DR. K., supra note 31, at 237. 
278 Nazario, supra note 272, at 6. 
279 Ophardt, supra note 273, at ~6 (adding that the data routes were clogged both in and out of the country). 
280 McGavran, supra note 199, at 265 ("for example, the Web site of the Georgian President, Mikhail Saakashvili, was 
hacked, and anyone who visited the site would see his photos juxtaposed with those of Adolf Hitler."). 
281 T1KK ET AL., supra note 18, at 68. 
282 See generally Nazario, supra note 272, at 6. 
283 T1KK ET AL., supra note 18, at 70. 
284 T1KK ET AL., supra note 18, at 70. 
285 Kevin M. Donovan, Expanding the Department of Defense's Role in Cyber Civil Support 18 (June 17, 
2011) (unpublished Master's Thesis, Joint Forces Staff College) (on file with author), http://dtic.mil/cgi-bin/ 
GetTRDoc?AD=ADA54564 l. 
286 John S. Fredland, supra note 230, at 15 (citing Tulip Systems and Google as companies allowing Georgia to use their 
hardware). 
287 T1KK ET AL., supra note 18, at 70. 
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Left Hook,288 the United States did not jeopardize the country's ability to remain neutral and immune 
from attack in the Russo-Georgian conflict when a private enterprise allowed Georgia to relocate the 
content of their websites onto United States servers;289 neither did Estonia or Poland, who actually 
offered state assistance, in contrast with the private assistance offered by the United States compa-
nies.290 
A. Issues of Sovereignty 
Before considering whether the law of neutrality was violated or whether it even applied, one 
must look at issues of sovereignty. Since both Tulip and Google hosted Georgian websites on their 
servers, one can assume that Georgian citizens at least accessed these websites, if not interacted with 
them. These sites were on servers located in the United States without the consent of the United 
States government. Therefore, Georgian citizens violated the sovereignty of the United States every 
time they accessed these websites. 291 Unless of course, there is a right of "transit passage,'' which 
would allow nationals of one State to freely transit the cyberspace of other States without the express 
permission of the sovereign. 
B. Why the Law of Armed Conflict Did Not Apply to These Cyber Attacks 
Assuming a right of "transit passage" exists, this analysis turns to the issue of neutrality. First, 
law of armed conflict did not apply to the cyber attacks and therefore neither did the law of neu-
trality292 because the cyber attacks were not sufficiently linked to the international armed conflict 
between Russia and Georgia. Although law of armed conflict clearly applied to the physical cross-
border conflict involving armed forces, this does not necessarily mean that law of armed conflict 
would apply to the cyber attacks.293 The application oflaw of armed conflict to the Georgian cyber 
attacks is highly problematic.294 "The objective evidence of the case is too vague to meet the neces-
sary criteria of both state involvement and gravity of effect."295 Although the media targeted Russia as 
being behind the DDoS or defacement attacks, there is no conclusive proof as to who was behind the 
attacks; some experts are even skeptical that the Russian government played any role.296 
288 Korns & Kastenberg, supra note 26, at 60 (asking whether the Georgian case impacted America's status as a cyber 
neutral and, more broadly, whether the United States can remain neutral during a cyber conflict). 
289 T1KK ET AL., supra note 18, at 83 ("the fact that a neutral state permits use of its telecommunications infrastructure 
and equipment does not automatically entail breach of neutrality for that state."). 
290 T1KK ET AL., supra note 18, at 83. 
291 This may seem improbable since Georgia is an ally of the United States and it is hard to believe the United States 
would object to an ally transiting its cyberspace. Compare this, however, to the physical world where that would translate 
to Canadians crossing the United States border without a passport. See Fredland, supra note 286 and accompanying text. 
292 T1KK ET AL., supra note 18, at 83. 
293 T1KK ET AL., supra note 18, at 80. 
294 T1KK ET AL., supra note 18, at 83. 
295 T1KK ET AL., supra note 18, at 83. 
296 T1KK ET AL., supra note 18, at 74-75. 
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There is no doubt regarding the involvement of the Russian hacker community in the 
cyber attacks: the coordination of and support to the attacks took place mainly in the 
Russian language and was conducted on Russian or Russia-friendly forums. However, 
there is no evident link to the Russian administration, and the Russian government has 
denied any involvement in the cyber assaults. The Project Grey Goose team was unable 
to find, in their research into the Russian hacker sites, any references to state organiza-
tions guiding or directing attacks."297 
33 
In fact, a self-appointed representatives of the Russian hacker underground claimed respon-
sibility for a "Stop Georgia'' website, which was set up to coordinate some of the cyber attacks on 
Georgian websites.298 When cyber attacks cannot be sufficiently linked to ongoing hostilities, the 
cyber attacks cannot take on the legal classification of the physical conflict. At this point, the cyber 
attacks must go through their own analysis. 
In the end, the damage was minimal - email disruptions and website unavailability. 299 The 
damages were further limited by the low interconnectivity of the country.300 "The main damage was 
in limiting the nation's possibilities to distribute information about the ongoing military conflict, 
in 'making its voice heard' to the world and in communicating with the Georgian people."301 The 
effects of the cyber attacks alone were not severe enough to amount to a "use of force" under Article 
2(4) and certainly not enough to justify self-defense in response to an "armed attack'' under Article 
51 302 therefore, neither the law of armed conflict nor the law of neutrality applied. 
C. Regardless, the Law of Neutrality Would Not Have Been Violated 
Even if LOAC did apply to the situation, the telegraph exception to Hague V would permit a 
neutral State to allow the use of its telecommunications infrastructure and equipment.303 
Of course, the level of state activism in permitting the use of telecommunications 
may range, from simply accepting data flow through private infrastructure to lend-
ing server space as was the case with Poland and Estonia, to actively supporting the 
functioning of telecommunications. Not all activities on this scale need necessarily be 
interpreted in a similar measure in the light of Article 8 of the Hague Convention cited 
above, but the smaller the degree of state activism, the less there is reason to speak of 
the state violating neutrality. 304 
297 T1KK ET AL., supra note 18, at 75. 
298 T1KK ET AL., supra note 18, at 75. 
299 Kaminski, supra note 7, at 82 (distinguishing "actual damage" from the immeasurable damage that resulted from the 
attacks). 
300 T1KK ET AL., supra note 18, at 78. 
301 T1KK ET AL., supra note 18, at 78. 
302 Todd, supra note 16, at 91-92 ("There was no burning buildings or smashed tanks or casualties usually associated 
with a traditional, kinetic armed attack ... The cyberspace events did not place either country's stability in jeopardy."). 
303 T1KK ET AL., supra note 18, at 83. 
304 T1KK ET AL., supra note 18, at 83. 
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In addition, the cyber attacks were not military operations since Russia denied all involve-
ment and there was no actual evidence to the contrary. 305 Therefore, the actions of the neutral States 
could not have interfered with military operations.306 Georgia also treated the cyber attacks as a com-
puter security issue, rather than as cyberwarfare. 307 The website that the neutral States assisted with 
were communication outlets and not military in nature. 308 
Finally, Hague V requires that if a neutral State allows the use of its telecommunications 
infrastructure by belligerents, it must do so impartially.309 Russia never requested any similar as-
sistance; therefore, there is no evidence of impartiality.31° Consequently, even if the law of armed 
conflict applied to the cyber attack in Georgia, the assisting States did nothing in violation of the law 
of neutrality. 311 
D. Cyber Cooperation 
The assistance by Poland, Estonia, and the United States companies has been described as a 
"cyber alliance."312 This alliance limited the damages that the cyber attacks caused on Georgia.313 The 
governments of Poland and Estonia supported Georgia with technical assistance and server space.314 
In addition, two private companies in the United States gave Georgia server space.315 Since the cyber 
attacks were considered the work of hackers, it was a criminal problem.316 As such, these attacks were 
separate from the international armed conflict, which was conducted on the ground in Georgia. It 
is in the interest of all States to have a global response to such criminal attacks. States should not be 
afraid to assist in such non-state sponsored cyber attacks, because they fear violating the law of neu-
trality. Cyber security is going to take a global effort to be effective. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The designers of the Internet were utopians, who created a decentralized network to with-
stand nuclear attack, intending it to be a domain free of government control. They believed that this 
new parallel world could escape the evils of government. The designers envisioned new communities 
305 T1KK ET AL., supra note 18, at 83. 
306 T1KK ET AL., supra note 18, at 83. 
307 T1KK ET AL., supra note 18, at 84. 
308 T1KK ET AL., supra note 18, at 84. 
309 Hague V, supra note 243, art. 8-9 (seeing the same obligation being observed by companies or private individuals 
owning telecommunications infrastructure). 
310 T1KK ET AL., supra note 18, at 84. 
311 T1KK ET AL., supra note 18, at 84. 
312 McGavran, supra note 199, at 266 (using this terms to explain how these nations helped Georgia mitigate the 
consequences of the cyber attacks, through the help of resources). 
313 McGavran, supra note 199, at 266. 
314 McGavran, supra note 199, at 266. 
315 T1KK ET AL., supra note 18, at 77. 
316 See generally McGavran, supra note 199, at 262 (explaining that criminal syndicates rent hijacked computers to the 
highest bidder for a low price, around four cents). 
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in cyberspace would develop better ways of regulating conduct than traditional government. In the 
beginning, it appeared that this new domain was borderless and beyond the control of States. 
With time, however, cyberspace succumbed to human nature and its malfeasance. Citizens 
are now looking to their sovereigns to police the bad acts occurring in cyberspace. As e-commerce 
has exploded in cyberspace, companies also want the protections offered by a sovereign such as stabil-
ity and preservation of property rights. The free flow of information has threatened the existence of 
other sovereigns, who control their people through restricting and molding the information available 
to their citizenry. 
As States exert control in cyberspace, borders are forming in cyberspace. These borders, 
however, are much different than the boundaries of a State's territory. They are jurisdictional bound-
aries affixed around each individual citizen of a state. China controls, through various measures, 
what its citizens can access on the Internet, but it does not stop electrons from crossing through 
its cyberspace. Determined Chinese nationals are still able to access this prohibited content. The 
United States has prosecuted its citizens who have committed illegal acts in cyberspace even though 
they were physically in another country when they connected to cyberspace. These boundaries are 
not defining physical territory in cyberspace, but rather allowing sovereigns to exert control on their 
citizens. They permit a sovereign to protect its citizens from prohibited information of one sort or 
another, whether it is child pornography or democratic principles. 
Like other global commons, cyberspace as we know it has value for all States. The Internet 
and e-commerce have allowed business to occur around the world in an instant and have opened 
hard-to-reach markets. Cyberspace has been a great equalizer between big and small States. It is in 
the interest of most States for cyberspace and the Internet to exist as it is today. Unlike other global 
commons, however, cyberspace needs regulations and policing, partly because of its accessibility to all 
people. 
Cyberspace is not naturally occurring and its architecture can be changed and is being 
changed all the time, but the original design of the Internet, which allows packets to freely travel 
from one point to another and automatically reroute to avoid traffic, must remain. The best analogy 
compares cyberspace to the international straits of the sea. In order to continue the current func-
tionality of the Internet, international law must acknowledge a right of transit passage in cyberspace. 
This would actually be nothing more than establishing a State practice based on current norms. Citi-
zens of one State violate the sovereignty of other States virtually every time they access the Internet. 
Given the design of the Internet, an email sent from one person in State X to another person in State 
X can transit States Y and Z in route. This State practice needs to be institutionalized. 
International law in the other domains developed over time and technology developed to fit 
the needs of States. Cyberspace is like no other domain. Although there is no way to control the flow 
of electrons in cyberspace and maintain the functioning of the Internet as we know it today, there 
are ways to control what content a person sees. A sovereign should be able to control the impact of 
the content of the Internet on its people. But as a world, there is a need to keep the backbone of the 
Internet alive. A right of transit passage would accomplish both objectives by allowing sovereigns to 
regulate their national cyberspace, while at the same time permitting electrons to freely transit cyber-
space. 
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The UN Charter outlaws war, but States still continue to have armed conflicts. States utilize 
every domain in these conflicts; there is no reason to believe the domain of cyberspace is any excep-
tion. Cyber warfare, however, may offer a way for States to battle without killing. If we are going to 
have war, we should not discourage the use of cyberspace, which can reduce the kinetic effects of war. 
Given the fact that cyberwar is possible, most scholars agree that the law of armed conflict should 
apply in cyberspace. 
Most States are currently conducting different types of cyber operations. With the grow-
ing acceptance of international law applying in cyberspace, law abiding States are worrying about 
potentially violating another State's neutrality. Since electrons take the fastest route on the Internet, 
a State cannot know whether a cyber operation will navigate through the cyberspace of a neutral 
State en route to its destination. Most military operations can occur without worrying about the law 
of neutrality since there is not an international armed conflict. The possibility of violating another 
State's sovereignty, however, is still an issue. Unless there is a right of transit passage, a State needs the 
permission of another State before its electrons transit through the other State's cyberspace. Since it 
is currently impossible to control the path of an electron through cyberspace,317 this is an infeasible 
burden. 
In an international armed conflict in cyberspace, the law of neutrality applies. Prior to evalu-
ating the rights and obligations of neutrals and belligerents under the law of neutrality, the issue of 
sovereignty must be addressed. If the electrons of one State cannot transit another State without vio-
lating that State's sovereignty, then the law of neutrality is irrelevant. If there is a right of transit pas-
sage in cyberspace, then international law can address the rights and responsibilities of a neutral State 
under the law of neutrality. The law does not prohibit the electrons from a belligerent State from 
transiting though a neutral State and it does not require a neutral State to stop these electrons from 
transiting its cyberspace as long as it impartially allows all belligerents to use its cyber infrastructure. 
No other interpretation of the law of neutrality is feasible in cyberspace. A fear of violating the law of 
neutrality should not hinder State action in cyberspace. 
317 Any future change that would allow one to control the path the packets of a message travel would destroy packet 
switching, one of the founding principles of the Internet. 
